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ABSTRACT
COMPULSORY INTEREST ARBITRATION IN PUBLIC EDUCATION:
A CASE STUDY 
by
Madeline Mary Keri 
Chairman: William P. Foster, Ed.D.
Resolution of impasse disputes in public sector 
education has emerged as a growing concern in recent 
years. The purpose of this study was to determine if the 
use of compulsory final offer interest arbitration has 
served as a viable means of resolving conflicts between 
boards of education and teacher associations in 
Connecticut.
Statistical examination of the ways in which 
contracts were settled, the types of issues arbitrated and 
the decisions of the arbitrator(s) was conducted on the 
182 arbitration awards made between 1979-80 and 1984-85 in 
Connecticut. Additionally, interviews were conducted with 
members of the Department of Education's arbitration panel 
and other individuals involved in the process in 
Connecticut. Of the 23 areas of issues for arbitration it 
was found that salary, workday/year, medical insurance, 
and leaves of absence were the most frequently arbitrated 
issues when comparisons were done between areas. Also, in
F : ..................
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the area of arbitral decisions it was found that 
arbitrators tend to be more favorable toward the 
association when deciding issues pertaining to salary and 
more favorable toward the board when deciding issues 
pertaining to workday/year. No other significant 
differences were found.
Additionally, the results of arbitrator interviews 
show that for the most part the process has worked well in 
Connecticut and that parties are generally in acceptance 
of compulsory arbitration for the resolution of contract 
disputes.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Chapter 1 
Statement of the Issue
The following piece of research is a descriptive 
study that examined the state of Connecticut in which 
compulsory final offer interest arbitration (hereinafter 
referred to as compulsory arbitration) is part of the 
collective bargaining statute for public school teachers.
It examined the six years 1979-80 through 1984-85 
following legislation calling for compulsory arbitration's 
enactment in Connecticut, and looked at the outcomes, 
both anticipated and unanticipated that have resulted.
By examining the brief history of compulsory arbitration 
in public education, this study endeavored to determine if 
legislated compulsory arbitration fosters collective 
bargaining in public education by serving as a satisfactory 
means for resolving impasse disputes. The study also sought 
to determine if any trends could be distinguished for the 
future of compulsory arbitration in the collective 
bargaining process for America's public school teachers.
1
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Significance of the Problem
In the collective bargaining process, parties are 
frequently unable to come to an agreement on the terms 
of a contract. Often, when an agreement cannot be 
reached the strike has been used as a means of dealing 
with impasse disputes between employer and employees in 
public education. Unfortunately, the strike can mean a 
loss of school days and a disruption to the educational 
process, loss of financial support through decreased 
subsidies and state allocations, and often create an 
outcry of public dissatisfaction with the bargaining 
parties. It was important to determine if there was a 
more appropriate way of dealing with impasse disputes, 
especially at a time when many states were redefining and 
amending their collective bargaining laws for public 
school teachers.
The purpose of this case study was twofold.
First, it provided statistical data on how the compulsory 
arbitration process had been utilized by the bargaining 
parties. It delved into the number of issues taken to 
impasse under the legislation, the frequency with which 
parties had reached a settlement without the use of any 
impasse procedure, how often parties had settled at a 
preliminary step in the impasse procedure, patterns of 
usage of the procedure, issues most frequently arbitrated,
¥  T......
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arbitrator rulings and the relationship of those 
arbitral rulings to the category of issue being 
arbitrated.
Secondly, by using the interviewing process the 
study examined the perceptions of people who were 
involved in the compulsory arbitration process and 
looked at their satisfaction or dissatisfaction with 
the procedure in Connecticut.
In choosing a case study approach, the researcher 
was able to glean information that would be of value 
to state legislatures that were revising or enacting 
collective bargaining legislation for public school 
teachers. This case study also attempted to answer 
the questions of many administrators and union 
representatives who were unfamiliar with the use and 
value of compulsory arbitration in the public education 
arena. The study enabled an interested individual 
to look at how the compulsory arbitration process has 
worked by making available both the statistical data 
and the perceptions of levels of satisfaction demonstrated 
by the groups and individuals involved in the process in 
Connecticut.
By using a case study approach the researcher was 
able to examine an entire state, including both 
metropolitan and rural areas, while maintaining feasible 
amounts of data to be analyzed. Also, since this study was
fr----------------
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to provide information for other state legislatures the 
inclusion of information on a statewide basis provided a 
total picture of how the process has worked. For this 
reason the researcher felt that a macro approach was 
of more value than a micro examination of a few 
specific cases of compulsory arbitration.
In choosing the state of Connecticut, the 
researcher first noted that this particular state's 
legislation was the most recent, while still providing a 
time span of six years usage. In this way the study would 
account for any responses that may have been attributed 
to the initiation of a new system. In addition, since 
Connecticut's legislation is recent it is more relevant 
to the changes now taking place in collective bargaining 
in the United States.
A second reason for choosing Connecticut is the 
state's use of a specific panel of arbitrators for
interest arbitration hearings. This contrasts to states
in which arbitrators are chosen from a listing of all
possible arbitrators within the state. This factor
allowed for a more detailed analysis of the arbitration 
panel itself, since its members had heard more than one 
or two cases over the six year period.
F   - --
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5
Definition of Terms
1. advisory interest arbitration - Interest 
arbitration which is counseling, gives suggestions, or 
is advising, but not imperative or conclusive.
2. arbitrator - A private, disinterested person chosen 
by the parties to a disputed question, for the purpose 
of hearing their contention, and giving judgement 
between them, to whose decision [award] the litigants 
[parties] submit themselves either voluntarily, or in 
some cases compulsory.
3. collective bargaining - A procedure in which the 
employer and employee representative bargain for the 
wages, hours, and other conditions of employment for the 
employee groups.
4. compulsory final-offer interest arbitration - (in 
the text shortened to compulsory arbitration) - 
Arbitration of the terms of a contract which is 
conclusive and which takes place where the consent of 
one of the parties is enforced by statutory provisions.
The arbitrator/arbitrators shall resolve separately each 
individual issue disputed by accepting the last best offer 
of either of the parties and are not permitted to 
compromise between the positions of the parties.
5. factfinding - The act of a third person determining 
a fact at issue between two parties in order to promote 
resolution of the issue at impasse.
¥
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6. final package - An award in which the arbitrator 
chooses the entire proposal of one side or the other.
7. impasse - A stalemate between parties concerning
the issues at dispute.
8. mediation - The act of a third person who 
interferes between two contending parties with a view 
to reconcile them or persuade them to adjust or settle 
their dispute.
9. statute - An act of the legislature declaring, 
commanding or prohibiting something; the written will of
the legislature, solemnly expressed according to the
forms necessary to constitute it the law of the state.
10. stipulated agreement - An agreement reached by the 
parties after an arbitration hearing has commenced.
11. voluntary arbitration - Arbitration depending on or 
arising from the mutual agreement of the parties.
F '
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Chapter 2 
Review of the Literature
Historical Background
Dunham (1976) notes that the earliest instance of 
interest arbitration in the United States probably 
occurred in 1786 between the seamen and their employers 
in New York City, the purpose being to establish the 
wages of the seamen (Mote, 1916). The practice of using 
interest arbitration as a means of solving disputes in 
the private sector continued to grow following the 
seamen's incident, and was recorded in settlements in 
the steel, mining and railroad industries in the late 
1880's. This practice eventually moved into the transit 
industry and at the turn of the century transit unions 
began to arbitrate the terms [interests] of new 
collective bargaining agreements (Kuhn, 1952? Dennis and 
Somers, 1973). Between 1900 and 1949 over 600 wage 
cases were arbitrated; in the second half of this 
century the use of interest arbitration to determine the 
wages and other conditions of employment continues to 
flourish in the local transit industry. Similarly, the
7
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first International Arbitration Agreement in the 
printing industry (Dennis and Somers, 1973) and 
agreements in the foundry and machinist industries 
utilizing interest arbitration were initiated during the 
early part of this century.
The United States' most pervasive experience with 
compulsory arbitration in the private sector is pointed 
out by Morris (1976) as being the creation of the first 
National War Labor Board in 1918 during World War I. 
Although the Board was to provide mediation and 
conciliation, it intervened directly in the 
establishment of substantive conditions and thus 
represented a form of interest arbitration. A second 
National War Labor Board was established with a similar 
purpose during World War II. Most of the 20,000 labor 
disputes determined during this Board's existence were 
impasses over the terms [interests] of collective 
bargaining agreements.
Following World War II the use of interest 
arbitration continued to expand with ten states 
establishing laws which provided for compulsory 
arbitration in certain vital services, primarily public 
utilites (Bernstein, 1947). It is significant to note 
that in 1947 there was very little state legislation 
concerned with mediation and arbitration outside of the 
public utility area. Presumably, at that time the
F  ■............ ....
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states intended to reduce the number of strikes in the 
larger field by weakening the bargaining power of trade 
unions. However, after about five years of extensive 
usage, these laws ceased to be of importance because of 
a 1951 Supreme Court ruling in Wisconsin decreeing that 
the subject matter in the aforementioned laws was 
preempted by the National Labor Relations Act.
Here it is important to make a distinction between 
interest arbitration in the private sector, and interest 
arbitration in the public sector, the latter of which is 
detailed in this study. Prasow and Peters (1983) point 
out that in the private sector, impasses over interest 
issues are not covered by statute and are ultimately 
resolved by a balancing of the strengths by the parties' 
(p. 311). "In the public sector, however, where an 
economic contest is, in most jurisdictions legally ruled 
out by bounds, the parties often seek a resolution of 
interest issues by resorting to fact finding or 
arbitration" (p.313). While the private sector's 
industrial relations are regulated almost entirely under 
the Labor Management Relations Act of 1970, and the 
Railway Labor Act of 1970, which are federal statutes, 
the public sector is regulated by individual state 
statutes and in some cases by the ordinances of 
municipalities, each of which are specific in their 
definitions of coverage.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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In the United States during the past 40 years the 
ever increasing number of organized public employees has 
made it necessary for state legislatures to include 
collective bargaining statutes, many of which include 
provisions for some form of interest arbitration, into 
the states' legal framework. Chauhan (1979) has noted 
that during the past 20 years state legislation 
governing public labor relations has proliferated with 
more than 2/3 of the states adopting formal collective 
bargaining policies. Horton (1975), Cocoran and Kutell 
(1978), and Compton-Forbes (1984) are others who have 
made reference to the large number of states which have 
enacted collective bargaining legislation for public 
employees in recent years.
Although the Arbitration Act of 1888 is generally 
considered the first federal labor law, Horton (1975) 
relates that as late as 1968 there was only one public 
employee relations statute providing for the use of 
interest arbitration. Dunham (1976) found that in the 
five year period from 1970-1975, sixteen states had 
amended or enacted major legislation for public 
employees. Four of those states utilized compulsory 
arbitration, six permitted strikes, four included fact 
finding as a final step, one had combination arbitration 
and right to strike, and one left impasse procedures at 
the discretion of the Board while it forbade strikes.
if  r ---------
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
11
These changes in legislation continued and by 1976 at 
least 20 states had formally placed the final 
responsibility for resolving collective bargaining 
disputes on arbitrators (Horton, 1975).
Outside of the United States, Canada and Australia 
have had extensive experience with compulsory 
arbitration in the public sector. In Australia, 
Commonwealth employees have had access to arbitration 
procedures since 1911, and for years bargaining parties 
had relied on the arbitration procedure instead of 
attempting to negotiate their contracts collectively. 
After 1965 the use of the strike became a more common 
practice for dealing with impasses in Australia because 
of changes that had been made in the criteria for 
determining arbitration awards and due to a basic 
deterioration in the unions' handling of the arbitration 
procedure. Still, the arbitration procedure has endured 
for over 50 years in Australia and even with its flaws 
has been preferred to other means of settling disputes 
(McAvoy, 1972).
On the other hand, Canadian federal workers first 
began to bargain in 1967 with the passage of the Public 
Service Staff Relations Act (PSSRA) which covered all 
federal employees and today represents more than 250,000 
employees in 100 bargaining units (Ponak and Wheeler, 
1980). Under the Canadian statute a bargaining agent
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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may elect to use compulsory arbitration, but must 
forfeit the unit's right to strike.
Compulsory arbitration has frequently been 
challenged on its legal grounds in America's courtrooms 
in its quest to achieve contract equity. Houseman 
(1973) points out that the main constitutional hurdle 
concerning compulsory arbitration has involved the 
question of whether the elected representatives of the 
people should be able to delegate to others the exercise 
of authority conferred upon them by law.
During the late 1800's cases concerning compulsory 
arbitrations' constitutionality in the public sector 
were already beginning to surface. In Mann v.
Richardson, 1873, the question of whether public 
officials had the right to submit discretionary matters 
to arbitrators first arose. In this case the court 
found that a dispute between the commissioner of 
highways and a homeowner over the price of the latter's 
home could not go to arbitration and therefore bind the 
town. The Circuit Court of Illinois in discussing the 
status of the public official said, "Where the law 
imposes a personal duty upon an officer in relation to a 
matter of public interest, he cannot delegate it to 
others, and therefore, such officer cannot submit such 
matters to arbitration."
It was years later, in 1951, that the first
F  r------------
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favorable decision of major proportions concerning 
compulsory arbitration in the public sector was decided 
by the Supreme Court of Errors in Connecticut in Norwalk 
Teachers Association v* Board of Education. The court 
was posed with the question of whether under Connecticut 
law arbitration was a permissible method to settle or 
adjust disputes between the plaintiff and the defendant. 
The court held that: (1) Teachers had the right to
organize and bargain over pay and conditions of 
employment (2) A Board of Education could enter into a 
contract which required grievance arbitration (3)
Mediation of disagreements was permissible (4) Teachers 
could not engage in concerted activities such as work 
stoppages and strikes and (5) Boards of Education could 
not surrender any of their legal policy making 
discretion to the bargaining process.
In recent years the constitutionality of many other 
compulsory arbitration laws has been challenged in 
various states. In 1979 Chauhan compiled a listing of 
18 states in which the laws had already been challenged. 
He found that the compulsory arbitration statutes had 
been upheld by the highest state courts in 
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Washington, New York,
Nebraska, Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, Wyoming, Wisconsin 
and Oregon. The highest state courts had declared the 
laws unconstitutional in California, Colorado, Utah and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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South Dakota, while the Supreme Courts of Maine and 
Michigan reached deadlocks which therefore left 
favorable lower court decisions in effect. (Table I to 
be found in Chauhan at page 37). In general, it was 
found that the courts tend to uphold state statutes 
which provide for compulsory arbitration in the public 
sector when the statutes are applied to serve the public 
interest.
In the public sector, the use of compulsory 
arbitration as a means of settling impasse disputes has 
increased in recent years with various authors examining 
the effectiveness, benefits, and cause and effects of 
its inclusion into the collective bargaining process.
The next segment of the review of the literature will 
address those different areas of interest in regard to 
compulsory arbitration and will present some of the 
changes that are now taking place in collective 
bargaining in America's public sector.
Compulsory Arbitration's Effectiveness as a Final Step 
in Impasse
Initial review of the literature in collective 
bargaining shows that compulsory arbitration has been 
found to be a more appropriate final step for settling 
impasse disputes in contract negotiations (Dunham, 1976;
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Gallagher, 1982).
Dunham (1976) in an examination of public employee 
bargaining found the preliminary impasse procedure of 
factfinding to be analogous with advisory arbitration in 
which bargaining parties are only advised and not bound 
by the law to abide by the arbitrator's recommendations.
He noted that after a few years of factfinding as the 
final step in impasse, the union tends to become 
stronger with the resulting consequence being illegal 
strikes. In his research, Dunham sent questionnaires to 
20 states and the City of New York, all of which were 
known to have an administrative agency responsible for 
the public employee collective bargaining law.
Information sufficient for inclusion in his study was 
obtained from 14 states and New York City.
After analysis of the data Dunham concluded that
(1) Three of four states that had used factfinding for 
six or more years had the highest incidence of strikes
(2) compulsory arbitration was utilized more often than 
factfinding as the final step of impasse (3) strikes 
seem to occur less frequently when compulsory 
arbitration rather than factfinding is the final step in 
impasse and (4) strikes occur approximately five times 
as often if they are legal than if they are illegal.
Feuille (1977) in his studies on the effectiveness 
of the compulsory arbitration experience of police and
F -------------  . . .
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firefighters in Eugene, Oregon for the years 1971-76 
concluded that in Eugene unions and management operating 
under a compulsory arbitration procedure can reduce 
their use of the procedure as they become familiar with 
it. Feuille examined the 12 sets of negotiations under 
the compulsory arbitration procedure during the five 
years investigated. In nine cases the parties were able 
to reach their own agreement on all issues while in two 
other cases the parties decreased reliance on all items 
with only one issue being taken to arbitration in each 
case. Feuille noted that in the last six negotiations 
no arbitration awards were issued (three in 1974-75 and 
three in 1975-76) with the parties reaching an agreement 
on their own without the help of a neutral third party. 
Feuille suggests that over time the compulsory 
arbitration procedure has become more rather than less 
effective in preserving the parties' incentives to reach 
their own agreements. It may be difficult to pinpoint 
the precise reasons for this phenomena but the author 
notes some possible reasons as being: (1) Early union
losses and the desire to avoid repetitions (2) The 
speedy arbitration time table (3) The total package 
selection requirement (4) The absence of impasse steps 
between negotiations and arbitration (5) Arbitrator 
encouragement of negotiations after the procedure has 
been invoked and (6) An early final-offer submission
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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deadline (five days prior to the arbitration process).
Gallagher and Pegnetter (1979) in their research 
evaluated the effectiveness of impasse procedures by 
examining data from the Iowa Public Employment Relations 
Act, a three step statutory procedure which uses 
mediation, factfinding and arbitration on an issue by 
issue basis.
During its first year in use 74% of all public 
employee contracts were under the new three step 
procedure. All remaining contracts from that time 
period were to be decided upon by the parties, with the 
parties using a mutually agreed upon impasse procedure 
other than the process required under the new statute.
To measure effectiveness of the three step process 
the authors first examined the number of impasses 
settled at each step of the procedure. Their results 
show a strong "filtering effect" as the level of 
uncertainty and the neutral's power increased. During 
the first year 154 (61.4%) negotiations utilized 
mediation, 113 (73.4%) of those impasses were settled 
and 41 proceeded to factfinding. Thirty-two of the 
remaining impasses (20.8%) were resolved in factfinding 
and only nine (5.8%) proceeded onto arbitration. Those 
nine arbitration cases represented only 3.6% of all 
contract negotiations during the statute's first year.
In the law's second year in use 44.7% of the
F  r
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negotiations requested mediation with 8.8% of the 
impasses reaching the final step of arbitration. Again, 
less than 4% (3.9%) of all contract negotiations ended 
in arbitration.
These percentages for arbitration usage are low 
when compared with other states in which the percentage 
of negotiations going to arbitration ranged from 10.4% 
in Wisconsin (1973-74), to 16.3% in Michigan (1973-76), 
to 30.1% in Pennsylvania (1969-74) and finally 55% in 
city government in Eugene, Oregon. Although these 
percentages are higher than those in Iowa it should be 
noted that the previous data requires careful 
interpretation due to statutory differences in the 
states and municipalities mentioned.
Gallagher and Pegnetter did deduce that a large 
difference in the propensity to use arbitration appears 
to be related to the factfinding step. If the parties 
negotiated an independent procedure in which the 
factfinding step was eliminated, the tendency for the 
bargaining relationship to use arbitration increased 
tremendously. They also found that there was a 
significant difference in the number of issues taken to 
arbitration after factfinding (3.9 issues) when compared 
with the number of issues taken to arbitration when 
factfinding was not included in the procedure (6.2 
issues).
F  '
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During the first two years of negotiations 13.95% 
of the parties utilized arbitration when factfinding was 
eliminated while 3.8% used arbitration under the 
statutory procedure when factfinding was the second step 
in the three tier process. This was found to be very 
high with county and state units in which 47.7% went to 
arbitration when factfinding was eliminated while only 
3.9% of the county and state units utilized arbitration 
when factfinding was retained. This may be an 
indication that the parties are unwilling to forego the 
costs of arbitration when in all probability the 
arbitrator will choose the factfinder's recommendation, 
a viable deduction since in this study the factfinder 
recommendation served in part as a basis for settlements 
in 54% of all issues brought to arbitration.
The authors' findings also indicate that: (1) The 
procedure generally increases pressure on the parties to 
settle (2) Reliance on the procedure does not seem too 
high and (3) Factfinding reduces the number of issues 
taken to arbitration.
Gallagher and Chaubey (1982) also investigated the 
impasse procedure used under the Iowa Public Employment 
Relations Act, examining its first five years (1975-76 
through 1979-80) of use. Their analyses focused on 
determining if bargaining representatives employ 
different post-factfinding position modification
W  '
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strategies in accordance with the factfinder's 
recommendations.
Their sample included 271 disputes (school and 
municipal and county governments) which utilized 
mediation and factfinding. Eighty-five or 31% of the 
disputes, representing 5% of all contract negotiations 
during that period, advanced to compulsory arbitration.
Due to an absence of the factfinder's or arbitrator's 
report 76 of the 85 cases, or 89% of the case population 
was used in the study. Of these parties seven had gone 
to arbitration at least twice during the five year 
period examined.
In the 76 cases examined 257 issues (3.4 per case 
average) were arbitrated. Neither party modified their 
position on 64.2% of the issues and for 34.6% of the 
issues a compromise settlement was recommended. Those 
compromises in turn constituted the largest portion of 
recommendations within cases.
Joint position modification was found to be 
substantially higher in single issue cases than in 
multiple issue cases. These findings relate to the 
expectation that position modification is associated 
with compromise recommendations. This is in line with 
Long and Feuille's (1974) observation that disputed 
issues of an "either-or" variety effect the extent of 
the parties' position modification. It is interesting
F  -
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to note that when a party submitted a final offer 
identical to the factfinder recommendations that 
position had a very high probability of being selected 
by the arbitrator.
In their conclusions Gallagher and Chaubey found 
that: (1) Parties advancing their disputes from
factfinding to arbitration engage in only limited 
position modification between the two steps and (2) 
Arbitrators are likely to reaffirm the impasse 
resolutions recommended by the factfinder. The authors 
also point out some key liabilities of the Iowa 
procedure that were evidenced by their findings. (1)
That parties' behaviors may be influenced by the 
perceived predictability of the arbitrator's awards 
given the factfinder recommendations; (2) parties' 
strategies in submitting final offers may differ 
depending on the importance of the issues; (3) there is 
a reluctance on the part of the arbitrator to override 
the factfinder's recommendations; and, (4) shifts occur 
in the locus of decision making from the arbitration to 
the factfinding step.
T h e  U s e  o f  C o m p u ls o r y  A r b i t r a t i o n  a s  a n  I n c e n t i v e  t o  
B a r g a i n
Stern, Rehmus, Lowenberg, Kasper and Dennis (1975)
F  ......
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and Gallagher (1978) are a few who maintain that the 
primary rationale behind compulsory arbitration is one 
in which the parties are afraid to lose completely and 
therefore are compelled to give a more reasonable 
proposal for consideration. Stern et al. (1975) support 
the premise that compulsory arbitration exerts a 
centripetal force on the parties to move toward a center 
ground. They go on to state that:
One of the claimed advantages of final- 
offer-by package [compulsory] arbitration over 
conventional arbitration is that the parties 
know that they may be penalized heavily if they 
do not formulate realistic positions.
Theoretically, the parties will reach 
settlements more often under such a system and 
in cases where agreement is not reached, they 
will be closer together so that the arbitrator 
will have less room for error (p. 184).
Gallagher (1978) initiated research that examined 
the first two years (1975-77) of impasse procedures 
under the Iowa Public Employment Relations Act. The two 
questions he explored were (1) Whether including the 
factfinder report at arbitration encourages the union 
and the employer to move closer to the factfinder's 
recommendation when proceeding from factfinding to 
compulsory arbitration and (2) to what extent and under
F   .........
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What conditions are arbitrators in Iowa public sector 
disputes likely to select the factfinder's 
recommendations from among the three alternative 
positions available: (1) employer offer (2) union offer
and (3) factfinder recommendation?
During the first two years under the Iowa statute 
96 negotiations utilized factfinding. Sixty-nine 
impasses were resolved in factfinding while 27 proceeded 
to arbitration. The data utilized in Gallagher's study 
involved 25 of the 27 cases (2 were excluded because of 
an absent or unclear report) that went to arbitration.
The 25 cases examined included 12 cases dealing with 
municipal services, 10 educational disputes and one 
county labor-management dispute.
The 25 cases covered a total of 77 issues in 
dispute. Of the 77 issues that advanced from 
factfinding to arbitration the factfinder recommended 
accepting either the union (15) or the employer's (29) 
position for a total of 44 issues. In the 33 remaining 
issues the factfinder encouraged settlement with a 
position different from those presented by either the 
union or employer at factfinding.
Those 33 issues were analyzed to determine the 
impact of the factfinder's recommendation on the 
propensity of the union and employer to modify their 
positions before arbitration. Gallagher found that
r--
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arbitrators have a strong tendency to accept the 
factfinder's recommendations. The following trends were 
also found to exists (1) there is a tendency for 
arbitrators to select factfinder's recommendations that 
for most issues lie somewhere between the union's and 
the employer's final offers; (2) the arbitrators show a 
tendency to accept the final offers of the party whose 
factfinding position received the factfinder's 
endorsement; and, (3) in multiple issue cases 
arbitrators generally selected those positions that lie 
closest to the factfinder's recommendation.
The findings also show that factfinding reports 
included both unilateral and bilateral movement by the 
parties except in cases where the factfinder is in 
agreement with one of the parties, in which case there 
was limited movement in either parties' bargaining 
position.
Weitzman and Stochaj's (1980) research analyzed the 
results of a survey regarding New Jersey's Chapter 85 of 
the Public Laws of 1977, commonly known as the Fire and 
Police Arbitration Act. Their survey was submitted to 
18 members of an appointed arbitration panel who had 
heard a majority of the dispute cases occurring during 
the first two years under the Act. Sixteen of those 
arbitrators were eventually interviewed.
The authors first looked at the usage rates of
F--------
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various impasse procedures under the new statute noting 
that in fiscal year 1978 there were 210 petitions to 
initiate compulsory arbitration with the arbitrator 
making the final economic decision in 67 cases. The 
decisions were in favor of the union 41 times and the 
employer 26 times. In fiscal year 1979 there was a 
slight increase and 221 petitions for arbitration were 
filed. During 1979 the arbitrator decided in favor of 
the union 15 times and the employer 18 times with 
additional cases pending, a situation that made it 
impossible to make any ratio comparisons between 
bargaining parties for the two years studied.
The second section of the survey included 
subsections of questions covering areas such as 
knowledge, preparation and representation of the 
parties, and certain criteria that arbitrators rely upon 
when rendering their decisions. The following trends 
were evidenced in the survey responses. (1) Arbitrators 
felt that the parties awareness of the arbitration 
process varies from "little" to "well informed" with 
awareness improving for both parties in the second year 
(2) In every case, arbitrators attempted to mediate 
disputes between parties. Parties reached an agreement 
in 1/3 of the cases and the mediation/arbitration 
approach resolved some of the issues at impasse in the 
remaining cases (3) Three-fourths of those surveyed felt
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that comparability with similar bargaining groups was 
the major criteria used to decide cases (4) Two-thirds 
of the respondents preferred conventional arbitration 
over compulsory arbitration because it gave the neutral 
third party more discretion and the ability to 
compromise differences and (5) Most arbitrators still 
note to date that compulsory arbitration as compared 
with conventional arbitration can increase the 
probability of reaching negotiated settlements by 
exerting a centripetal force on the parties to move 
toward a center ground, an observation confirmed by 
others (Stern et al., 1975; Holden, 1976; Compton- 
Forbes, 1984).
Bacharach and Lawler's (1981) behavioral theory of 
bargaining, a dependence theory with a central dimension 
of power, was used to derive certain hypotheses about 
the impact of strikes and compulsory arbitration on 
teacher salaries (Delaney, 1983). Delaney's analysis of 
arbitration and strike use included all Illinois and 
Iowa (K-12) school districts who negotiated collective 
bargaining agreements in 1978-79, 1979-80, and 1980-81.
In order to test comprehensive availability the sample 
also included data on 770 full time public school 
teachers taken from the Current Population Survey's 
(CPS) May 1979 data tape.
Generally, the collective bargaining literature has
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shown that in the area of arbitration usage results in 
awards have been very similar to the terns of the 
negotiated agreement (Anderson, 1979; Bloom, 1981), The 
author also cites previous studies by Stern et al,
(1975) and Delaney and Feuille (1982) on the impact of 
compulsory arbitration in bargaining outcomes, both of 
which indicate that the availability of arbitration 
positively affects wages. These findings coincide with 
similar outcomes demonstrated in regard to non wage 
bargaining outcomes that are noted by Kochan and Wheeler 
(1975) .
Final results of Delaney's study show that the 
availability of compulsory arbitration appears to 
increase teacher salaries by approximately 10% while the 
use of compulsory arbitration in Iowa had no effect on 
teacher salaries. It was also found that the 
availability of the right to strike raises teacher 
salaries by approximately 9% while the use of the strike 
by Illinois public school teachers positively affects 
their subsequent salaries.
These results tend to suggest that strike use 
affects teacher salaries but that arbitration use does 
not. However, availability of both arbitration and the 
legal or de facto right to strike has similar effects on 
salary levels, increasing them by approximately 10%.
Olson (1980) in his analysis of the effects on
W  :...  ..
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firefighters' wages under different impasse procedures 
(factfinding and compulsory arbitration) observed 
positive effects in relation to salaries when compulsory 
arbitration was used. In his examination of 72 cities 
with populations of 100,000 or more, initial regression 
results indicated positive effects under compulsory 
arbitration in respect to firefighters' wages. This 
varied over time (a six year period) with the impact of 
arbitration emerging as a variable ranging from 
generally insignificant for the 1972-74 period to as 
high as 6% for some cases in 1975-76. Accordingly, if a 
statute were enacted in 1972, by 1977 wages would be 
3.12% to 6.54% higher than they would have been were it 
not for the legislation. Olsen found these results to 
be larger than estimates by Stern et al. (1975) and 
Kochan et al. (1977) in which wages were examined 
immediately following the passage of compulsory 
arbitration laws. He attributes this to the fact that 
the full impact of compulsory arbitration legislation, 
in relation to contract terms, may not be realized until 
years after the law has been enacted.
In findings contrary to Delaney's and Olson's 
Lowenberg (1971) in an examination of arbitration 
availability and wages compared policemens' wages in New 
York, Ohio and Pennsylvania over a six year period. Of 
the three states, only Pennsylvania made arbitration
F  :
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a v a i l a b l e  t o  r e s o l v e  n e g o t i a t i o n  i m p a s s e s .  D e s p i t e  t h i s  
f a c t ,  t h e  l e v e l  o f  p o l i c e  w a g e s  i n  P e n n s y l v a n i a  s e v e r a l  
y e a r s  a f t e r  t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  c o m p u l s o r y  a r b i t r a t i o n  
r e m a in e d  g e n e r a l l y  l o w e r  t h a n  t h e  s a l a r i e s  o f  p o l i c e  i n  
m u n i c i p a l i t i e s  o f  c o m p a r a b l e  d e m o g r a p h ic  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  
i n  n e i g h b o r i n g  s t a t e s .
Farber and Katz's (1979) research develops a model 
of bargaining in the presence of an arbitration 
procedure which examines the implications of that model 
for the usage rates of the arbitration procedure.
The authors initially point out that the major 
source of leverage in arbitration is derived from the 
uncertainty of the parties regarding the behavior of the 
arbitrator. The model which they developed utilized the 
construct of maximization of the expected behavior by 
agents in the presence of uncertainty. This construct 
is based upon the risk preferences of the parties. The 
framework for the model was introduced by von Neumann 
and Morgenstern and has become a part of standard 
economic analysis (Luce and Raiffa, 1957). In essence, 
if the parties are risk adverse they would be willing to 
settle for less than the expected arbitration award. 
Alternatively, if the parties enjoy risk they must be 
paid a premium in order to be discouraged from 
"enjoying" the risk of the arbitration process.
T h e  m o d e l  s e e k s  t o  d e t e r m i n e  i f  t h e r e  i s  a
F
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"contract zone" (area in which any settlement is 
considered by both parties to be preferable to 
arbitration) defined by the risk preferences of the 
parties and the expectations of the parties concerning 
the arbitrator's behavior. The authors found almost a 
total absence of empirical evidence in collective 
bargaining literature concerning the risk preferences of 
the parties in a collective bargaining situation.
However, they do believe that the union is likely to 
have more of an aversion to risk than the employer.
Their reason being that since wages are probably the 
primary source of income for union members, the loss of 
that primary income source could result in severe 
consequences to those union members. In the context of 
this particular model, it is therefore likely that the 
union is more risk adverse than is the public sector 
employer.
A major implication with the model is that the 
presence of any arbitration procedure determines the 
environment within which the parties negotiate, and 
consequently, directly affects the terms of the 
agreement. The difference between arbitrated and 
negotiated settlements, while not a function of the 
average arbitration award, was found to be related to 
the risk preferences and bargaining power of the parties 
involved and also as a result of the uncertainty of the
F   .........
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arbitrator's actions.
Farber and Katz did make some other conclusions 
about their model, the first being that uncertainty 
about the arbitration award will create a range of 
potential negotiated settlements only if risk aversion 
dominates. Secondly, as parties become familiar with 
arbitrators and the arbitration procedure the 
uncertainty of the arbitration procedure will be 
reduced. Thirdly, to the degree that arbitrators rely 
on the results of the factfinder in making awards the 
factfinding recommendation will provide information to 
the parties concerning the arbitrator's behavior, an 
observation also confirmed by Gallagher (1978) and 
Gallagher and Chaubey (1982).
Canada's Public Service Staff Relations Act (PSSRA) 
covering all federal employees has also appeared to 
serve as an incentive to bargain since its inception in
1967. Prior to the first round of negotiations under 
Canada's new act, bargaining agents for 101 units 
covering 160,000 employees opted for the arbitration 
procedure. For those employees who were subject to 
arbitration, 94 agreements were negotiated without 
reference to arbitration. Out of the six disputes 
referred to arbitration, three were settled before the 
hearing commenced, one was settled just after the 
hearing began and arbitration awards were issued for the
F    "  '
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two remaining disputes (Finkleman, 1971). Obviously, 
the availability of arbitration did not destroy 
collective bargaining in its first round in Canada's 
public sector. In addition, Canadian federal employees 
who are dissatisfied with the results of the arbitration 
process can always switch to the conciliation procedure. 
This ultimately allows them to strike, an alternative 
unavailable to public employees who are subject to 
compulsory arbitration procedures in the United States.
The Narcotic and "Chilling" Effect of Compulsory 
Arbitration
Another concern which may result when using 
compulsory arbitration is the development of a narcotic 
effect of its usage. The narcotic effect occurs when 
after an initial experience with arbitration, a growing 
reliance on the arbitration procedure ensues, and the 
parties continue to initiate the use of arbitration in 
subsequent collective bargaining proceedings rather than 
attempting to reach a settlement on their own. This 
narcotic effect is often said to generate a chilling 
effect on the negotiations process, causing parties to 
allow a neutral third party to make their bargaining 
decisions for them.
Stern (1974) in viewing Wisconsin's record found 
that such a narcotic effect did not result in Wisconsin
IT - —  ---------------------  "
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where the parties tended to settle disputes by 
themselves rather than abdicate the responsibility to 
others. In about 2/3 of the 173 negotiations for the 
year 1973, the parties reached agreement without any 
third party assistance. Mediation took place in the 
remaining 1/3 of contract negotiations with 3/4 of those 
mediated disputes being resolved. In only 9% of the 173 
negotiations were arbitral awards issued. Results 
similar to those found in 1973 were also recorded for 
Wisconsin's negotiation agreements in 1974.
The Wisconsin record tends to refute the statement 
made by Willard Wertz at the 1963 meeting of the 
National Academy of Arbitrators in Chicago during which 
he stated that:
E x p e r i e n c e  -----  p a r t i c u l a r l y  t h e  W ar L a b o r  B o a rd
experience during the 401s --  shows that a
statutory requirement that labor disputes be 
submitted to arbitration has a narcotic effect on 
private bargainers, that they turn to it as an easy
  and habit forming --  release from the
obligation of hard, responsible bargaining.
Lipsky and Drotning (1977) in their findings from 
research on the narcotic effect of compulsory 
arbitration i 'ew York came to a different conclusion. 
They examined the use of various impasse procedures 
utilized by teacher associations and school districts in
W ■
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New York during the first five years (1968-72) of New 
York's Taylor Law. The authors examined whether a 
narcotic effect was evident during the time in question 
and to what extent salary settlements differed from 
settlements that would have been expected in the absence 
of the impasse procedures mandated under the Taylor Law.
The study sample included only districts that 
actually engaged in negotiations in any of the years 
1968-72. The number of districts negotiating varied in 
number from a low of 597 in 19 71 to a high of 706 in
1968. In absolute terms the number of districts at 
impasse increased from 172 in 1968 to 358 in 1972. The 
authors' data shows that by 1972 only 44% of the teacher 
units in New York State were able to reach agreement on 
contract terms without third party intervention.
In examining the level of impasse at which 
settlements were made it is noted that over time 
factfinders settled more and more teacher cases by means 
of mediation, rather than by issuing a formal 
factfinding report.
In examining if a narcotic effect resulted, the 
authors show that during the 1968-72 period 154 (22.3%) 
of the districts never had an impasse, 51 (7.3%) went to 
impasse every year and 42% went to impasse half of the 
time. These statistics demonstrate that a significant 
proportion of New York teacher bargaining units went to
W  .............
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impasse during the 1968-72 period.
The authors also applied multivariate analysis to 
the data and through the use of regression and 
discriminant analysis tried to answer the question; What 
were the most important factors leading to the 
declaration of an impasse? They found unambiguous 
evidence that the most important determinant of an 
impasse in a district in one year was the existence of 
an impasse in the district in the preceding year. About 
30% of the variance in any one year's impasse experience 
could be explained by the previous year's impasse 
experience. No other economic or environmental factor 
tested came close to this level of explanatory power.
In fact, most independent variables tested were 
insignificant. The authors felt that this provided the 
clearest evidence of a narcotic effect with New York 
teacher bargaining units.
Lipsky and Drotning also examined the impact of the 
impasse procedure on salary levels. Their model shows 
the regression coefficient for the various impasse steps 
when three different salary points from teacher salary 
schedules were used as dependent variables. The 
following trends were apparent: (1) the use of impasse
procedures generally had an insignificant effect on the 
base level of salaries; (2) use of the impasse 
procedures had a small or insignificant effect on the
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base level of the two higher salary points in the first 
year (1968) of the Taylor Law; (3) in 1969, 1970 and 
somewhat in 1971, teachers gained significantly higher 
salaries at the two higher salary points when using an 
impasse procedure; and, (4) teachers who used the strike 
gained less than their colleagues who settled their 
contract differences in mediation, factfinding or higher 
impasse steps.
A study by Wheeler (1978) which introduced a set of 
measures of compromise activity in bargaining, was 
conducted to measure the occurrence of any chilling in 
the collective bargaining process for firefighters. The 
analysis was to determine whether compulsory arbitration 
has a chilling effect on bargaining by comparing the 
amount of compromise activity or movement which takes 
place in the presence v. absence of a compulsory 
arbitration law.
The sample for his original study in 1972 included 
370 cities which bargain collectively with the 
International Association of Fire Fighters (IAFF). 
Questionnaires were sent to individuals identified as 
negotiators for IAFF locals or city management. Only 
responses which involved the use of an impasse 
resolution procedure were used with the sample including 
140 (37%) of the original 370 cities. Since wages were 
the basic issue in nearly all negotiations the author
W'
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felt that if a chilling effect was to be found it was 
likely to appear in respect to wages. Therefore, data 
was collected in relation to wage demands and offers in 
the negotiation process. To analyze the data a series 
of measures of compromise activity (movement by the 
parties) was constructed. Less movement by the parties 
in the presence of a compulsory arbitration law is 
viewed of as being supportive of the argument that 
compulsory arbitration chills bargaining. The measures 
of movement in bargaining from opening position to 
impasse position, using the issue of wages, were 
constructed as follows:
Management Movement to Impasse Offer:
Management Impasse Offer - Management Opening Offer
Existing Wage X 100
Union Movement to Impasse Demand:
Union Opening Demand ~ Union Impasse Demand
Existing Wage X 100
The measure of the gap between the union impasse 
demand and the management impasse offer were constructed 
as follows with a high score on either of the last two 
measures indicating a low amount of compromise activity: 
Gap:
Union Impasse Demand - Management Impasse Offer 
Gap as Percentage of Existing Wage:
F '
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Union Impasse Demand - Managaement Impasse Offer 
Existing Wage X 100
The author proceeded to compare behavior under both 
factfinding and compulsory arbitration since factfinding 
is not a binding procedure while arbitration is, using a 
t test to measure movement. Therefore, if the chilling 
effect does exist it would be greater under compulsory 
arbitration than under factfinding which does not bind 
the parties.
The findings exhibit significantly less movement by 
management from opening offer to impasse under 
compulsory arbitration than under factfinding with union 
movement being insignificant under these two conditions 
of impasse. When the gap between union and management 
positions was measured both in dollar terms and as a 
percentage of the existing wage, it appeared that less 
movement occurred in the presence of compulsory 
arbitration than in the presence of factfinding. The 
data provides some evidence that compulsory arbitration 
does have a chilling effect on public sector collective 
bargaining with firefighters. This was most evident 
when viewing management bargainers who had a reluctance 
to change position on the starting wage in cases where a 
compulsory arbitration law existed. Some kind of 
chilling is also suggested by the data which shows that 
the gap remaining between parties' impasse positions was
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greater under compulsory arbitration than under 
factfinding.
Gallagher and Pegnetter (1979) also make reference 
to criticisms of statutes such as Iowa's in which 
mandatory arbitration procedures are believed to "chill" 
the bargaining process. Under the Iowa plan the authors 
found that 25% of the bargaining relationships that used 
factfinding in round one and then negotiated went onto 
use factfinding again in the second round of bargaining.
It was noted that none of the bargaining relationships 
that used arbitration in the first round repeated 
arbitration in the second round while seven of the nine 
bargaining units that used all three steps in round one 
settled in round two without an impasse or at the 
mediation stage. These findings also refute the premise 
that compulsory arbitration "chills" bargaining and 
creates a narcotic effect on the usage of arbitration to 
settle future impasses.
Mann (1981) also notes that in Connecticut during 
the first year of the new law providing for compulsory 
arbitration, 50% of the impasses went to arbitration but 
that by 1981-82 fewer than 30% took a similar route, 
showing a significant decline as opposed to an increase 
or narcotic effect in arbitration usage.
Compulsory Arbitration as a Deterrent to the Strike
¥
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In recent years public labor union officials have 
feared public repercussions against strikes. As the 
toll of strikes has mounted, the public's willingness to 
resist unions and future strikes has been strengthened. 
The support President Reagan received for his stand 
against the air traffic controllers demonstrated 
evidence for such a backlash against unions. For that 
reason, unions have for the most part endorsed 
compulsory arbitration as a means of avoiding work 
stoppages while achieving bargaining goals (Johnson, 
1983). These union officials have argued that 
compulsory arbitration is a viable quid-pro-quo for 
foregoing the strike option, an observation made by 
others (Anderson, 1969; McKelvey, 1969; Lowenberg, 1971; 
Greer, 1978).
Lowenberg (1971) reports that preliminary 
assessment on the use of compulsory arbitration as a 
substitute for the strike has been favorable as far as 
the absence of strikes is concerned. In Pennsylvania, 
Lowenberg found that under Act 111 of 1968 for 
firefighters and police there were at least 66 
arbitration awards during its first year in use. He 
also found that the availability of compulsory 
arbitration did not terminate collective bargaining 
among police and firefighters as 2/3 (133 of 198) of the
IF
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municipalities discussed in his article arrived at a 
negotiated settlement. In addition, there were no 
strikes by police and firefighters during that time.
West (1980) found that in Wisconsin settlements 
have been reached more quickly and with better results 
since the ̂ state adopted Senate Bill 15 (SB 15) giving 
teachers the use of compulsory arbitration to settle the 
terms of a contract. He notes that in Wisconsin there 
were no illegal strikes in units of 500 teachers or less 
since the passage of SB 15. Murphy, Fleming and 
Broeniman (1980) concur stating that Senate Bill 15, 
which provides for compulsory arbitration has balanced 
the relative power of [school] boards and [teacher] 
associations by virtually eliminating teacher strikes in 
Wisconsin.
In other parts of the country compulsory 
arbitration statutes which effect public education have 
also been viewed of as a deterrent to the strike. Mann 
(1981) in reference to Connecticut, feels that the laws 
mandating mediation and compulsory arbitration in the 
revised statute of 1979 may go a long way toward 
improving the working relationship between teacher 
bargaining units and Boards of Education in the state. 
This revision in the law is said to have had its roots 
in the Bridgeport, Connecticut teachers' strike of 1978 
during which a judge levied a $194,000 fine on the
w  v
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
42
strikers and sent 274 teachers to jail —  the largest 
number of public employees in American history to go to 
jail. The National Education Association's (NEA) 
general counsel, Robert Chanin, in reference to the 
Bridgeport strike relayed that "if the courts become 
hostile toward teacher strikes, binding interest 
arbitration [compulsory arbitration] is likely to emerge 
as an alternative to collective bargaining."
Summary
America's experience with compulsory arbitration in 
the public sector has been limited when comparing it to 
that of the private sector or nations such as Australia 
and Canada. Although compulsory arbitration is in its 
infancy stage in the United States it has already made 
dramatic inroads in the vital services and more recently 
in the realm of public education.
Proponents of compulsory arbitration view the 
process as a viable means of settling interest disputes 
while continuing to maintain public welfare as a top 
priority. It has worked well as a deterrent to the 
strike, especially in states where police and 
firefighters are prevented from withholding services 
which provide for the health and safety of the public.
Conversely, it has been looked at as being
¥  :
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detrimental to the collective bargaining process by 
those individuals who do not view compulsory arbitration 
as an acceptable means for settling interest disputes. 
Adversaries of compulsory arbitration feel that it 
breaks down the bargaining process and is a "scapegoat" 
for parties who are unwilling to sit down and bargain.
R e g a r d l e s s  o f  how  i t  h a s  b e e n  v i e w e d ,  c o m p u l s o r y  
a r b i t r a t i o n  i s  r a p i d l y  b e c o m in g  a n  a c c e p t e d  p a r t  o f  
p u b l i c  s e c t o r  c o l l e c t i v e  b a r g a i n i n g  i n  t h e  U n i t e d  
S t a t e s .  P r i o r  r e s e a r c h  i n  t h e  a r e a  h a s  n o t e d  b o t h  t h e  
p o s i t i v e  a n d  n e g a t i v e  a s p e c t s  o f  i t s  u s e  a n d  
a v a i l a b i l i t y  u n d e r  t h e  l a w ,  w h i l e  a  r e c e n t  u p s u r g e  i n  
r e s e a r c h  o n  t h e  s u b j e c t  h a s  d e m o n s t r a t e d  t h e  n e c e s s i t y  
t o  k n o w  e v e n  m o re  a b o u t  c o m p u l s o r y  a r b i t r a t i o n .
A review of the literature demonstrates that 
presently there is a need for further research in the 
area of compulsory arbitration for public school 
teachers. Only within the last 10 years has it emerged 
as an area of impasse dispute resolution available to 
the country's teaching workforce. Studies such as this 
one will provide the information needed to adequately 
analyze the advantages and disadvantages of using 
compulsory arbitration as a means of settling impasse 
disputes in the years to come.
Finally, as more and more states examine the 
possibilities of including compulsory arbitration in the
I  r ---------------
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revision or development of collective bargaining 
legislation, it will be necessary to acknowledge the 
greater role that it will be playing in the future of 
collective bargaining for America's public school 
teachers.
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Chapter 3
The History of Collective Bargaining Legislation
in Connecticut
Initial development for the future of collective 
bargaining legislation for public school teachers in the 
state of Connecticut was realized in 1951 when the 
Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors in Norwalk Teachers' 
Association v. Board of Education [138 Conn. 269, 83 
A2d 482 (1951)] held that teachers had the right to 
organize and bargain over pay and working conditions 
with their board of education (Id. at 277, 83 a.2d at 
486) .
Connecticut's collective bargaining legislation for 
public school teachers has come a long way since that 
initial decision in Norwalk. Today, Connecticut has 
one of the most comprehensive collective bargaining laws 
in education, and may be a forerunner of what is to come 
in other states that are in the process of adopting or 
changing collective bargaining legislation for public 
school teachers.
Following the Norwalk decision, Connecticut's 
Commissioner of Education appointed a committee to
45
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examine the working relationship between teacher 
organizations and boards of education in the state.
Their final report, Bulletin 85 (Connecticut State Board 
of Education, Principles and Procedures in Working 
Relations of Boards of Education and Teacher 
Organizations) was adopted in 1957. Bulletin 85, with 
some revisions, provided the background for 
teacher/board bargaining in Connecticut until 1965.
During that time period Connecticut's General Assembly 
also adopted its first statute which dealt with the 
collective bargaining process for public school 
teachers. Public Act 61 - 562 stated that: "Members of
the teaching profession shall have the right to join or 
refuse to join any organization for professional or 
economic improvement without prejudice." (1961 Conn.
Pub. Acts 562). This statute was the first in a line of 
legislation which would deal with boards of education 
and teacher negotiations in the state of Connecticut.
Over the years, a number of additional acts were 
adopted which further developed the collective 
bargaining structure for Connecticut's public school 
teachers. Public Act 65 - 298 provided for the 
designation of representatives to represent employees in 
negotiations, "with respect to salaries and other 
conditions of employment." (1965 Conn. Pub. Acts 298, 
ss 3). In 1967, Public Act 67 - 752 dealt with the
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selection of exclusive bargaining representatives (1967 
Conn. Pub. Acts 752, ss 1), while Public Act 69 - 811 
gave the Commissioner of Education the power to certify 
or refuse to certify an exclusive bargaining 
representative [1969 Conn. Pub. Acts 811, ss 2 (d)].
This Act also provided for an arbitration panel of not 
less than ten or greater than twenty-five members to 
hear disputes.
Additional legislation occurred in 1975 when the 
General Assembly instructed the State Board of Education 
to prepare a set of guidelines to cover good faith 
bargaining, fair labor practices and conditions of 
employment [1975 Conn. Acts 9 (Spec. Sess.)].
In 1976, Public Act 76 - 403 provided for various 
other amendments. One specifically mandated a strict 
timetable for the commencing and progression of 
negotiations, stating that negotiations were to begin 
"no fewer than one hundred eighty days prior to the 
board of education's budget submission date." A second 
provided standards of practices that were prohibited for 
both boards of education and employee organizations (Id. 
ss 5).
The year 1979 brought two major legislative 
dictates that would further affect teacher bargaining in 
the state. One, Public Act 79 - 422, permitted the 
negotiation of the inclusion of an agency fee provision
F  ■...........
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into collective bargaining agreements [1979 Conn. Acts 
422 (Reg. Sess.)]. .The second, Public Act 79 - 405, 
which this study deals with in detail, provided that, if 
parties were unable to resolve contract disputes, 
arbitration of those disputes, on an issue by issue 
basis would become final and binding instead of advisory 
[1979 Conn. Acts 405 (Reg. Sess.)]. (See Appendix A for 
complete proof).
Initially, the Act (Public Act 79 - 405) 
established an arbitration panel with fifteen members, 
five to represent the interests of the boards of 
education, five to represent the interests of the 
exclusive bargaining representatives of certified 
employees and five to represent the interests of the 
public in general. Boards of education and unions would 
nominate individuals to serve as advocate arbitrators 
for their respective parties and the State Board of 
Education would nominate arbitrators to represent the 
public interests. The governor would then appoint 
fifteen arbitrators whose term would be concurrent with 
the governor's. [1979 Conn. Acts 405, ss 1 (a) (3)
(Reg. Sess.)]. Under this initial Act, parties could 
choose a single impartial arbitrator or a tripartite 
(three member) panel. [Id. ss 1 (c) (1)].
The arbitrator or tripartite panel was then to 
decide the issues in dispute on an issue by issue basis,
F : ...............
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
talcing into consideration the last best offer of each of 
the bargaining parties [1979 Conn. Acts 405, ss 1 (c)
(4) (Reg. Sess.)], while using the following six 
criteria to formulate decisions: (1) The negotiations
between the parties prior to arbitration; (2) the public 
interest and the financial capability of the school 
district; (3) the interests and welfare of the employee 
group; (4) changes in the cost of living; (5) the 
existing conditions of employment of the employee group 
and those of similar groups; and, (6) the salaries, 
fringe benefits, and other conditions of employment 
prevailing in the state labor market [1979 Conn. Acts 
405, ss 1 (c) (4) (Reg. Sess.)] in issuing their award.
Any stipulations previously agreed to were to be 
incorporated into the arbitration award, and the final 
binding award could not be rejected by the community's 
legislative body (board of finance).
Since that initial legislation in 1979, there have 
been some additional amendments to Public Act 79 - 405.
In 1983, there was an increase in the size of the 
arbitration panel from fifteen to twenty-one, giving 
each group seven members rather than five. [1983 Conn. 
Acts 72 ss 2 (c), (d) (Reg. Sess.)] This session also 
provided for a change in the mediation and arbitration 
timetables [Id. ss 5 (b), (c)]. Under the 1983 
amendment, mediation would commence one hundred ten days
¥
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prior to budget submission and arbitration would 
commence eighty-five days prior to budget submission.
This shortened the previous time periods by ten and five 
days respectively. Three other timeline changes 
occurred at this time. First, the time of the initial 
arbitration hearing is to take place between the seventh 
and fifteenth day following selection of the neutral 
arbitrator [Id. ss (c)J. The two other changes extended 
the length of the arbitration hearing period from twenty 
to twenty-five days, and the timeline for the issuance 
of a written award went from fifteen to twenty days.
[Id. ss 5 (b), (c)].
Later, Public Act 83 - 342 provided for awarding 
reasonable attorney's fees, costs and legal interest on 
money withheld as a result of the arbitral decision 
[1983 Conn. Acts 342, subdiv. (7) ss (c)].
In 1984, Public Act 84 - 459 was amended to require 
that the written arbitral decision contain a narrative 
explaining the evaluation by the arbitrators of the 
evidence presented for each item upon which a decision 
was rendered. This narrative was to use the six 
criteria provided under Public Act 79 - 405 ss 1 (c) (4) 
(Reg. Sess.).
In 1985, there was once again a change in the 
number of members sitting on the arbitration panel.
Public Act 85 - 343 increased the number of arbitrators
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from twenty-one to twenty-three, with the additional 
members representing the public interests. Another 
change in the numbers was prompted in 1986 during a 
special session of the legislature, during which Public 
Act 86 - 1 increased the number of arbitrators 
representing the public interests from nine to fifteen 
C1986 Conn. Acts 1, ss (a) (Spec. Sess.)]. The 
amendment also substituted a panel of arbitrators 
submitted by the American Arbitration Association for a 
list of arbitrators submitted by the State Board of 
Education. Finally, it provided that the commissioner 
designate rather than the party arbitrators select the 
third impartial arbitrator.
The most recent amendments from the original Act of 
1979 are found in Public Act 87 - 206 which again deals 
with a change in the number of panel members. Under the 
most recent amendment, there shall be not less than 
twenty-four nor more than twenty-nine persons serving on 
the arbitration board [1987 Conn. Acts 206, ss (1) (a)]. 
Seven will represent the interests of local and regional 
school boards, seven will represent the interests of the 
exclusive bargaining representatives of certified 
employees and not less than ten nor more than fifteen 
members shall be the impartial representatives of the 
interests of the public in general [Id. Sec. 1 (c)].
This amendment also provides that the list of names of
r    -.
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arbitrators for the public interest will now come from 
the list of names submitted by the State Board of 
Education [Id. Sec. 1 (3)]. Additionally, the third 
arbitrator on an arbitration panel is to be selected by 
the arbitrators for the other two parties, with failure 
to do so within five days resulting in the 
commissioner's choosing the third arbitrator [Id. Sect.
2 Sub. div. 1 ss (c)3.
Today the legislation for mediation - arbitration 
in Connecticut is quite definitive. The numbers on the 
arbitration panel have changed during the years, but 
presently stand at twenty-four to twenty-nine, with 
seven arbitrators representing the interests of boards 
of education, seven representing the exclusive 
bargaining representatives of certified employees, and 
no less than ten nor more than fifteen representing the 
interests of the public in general [1987 Conn. Acts 206, 
ss (1) (a)3* Impartial representatives of the interests 
of the public in general shall be: Residents of the
state of Connecticut, experienced in the public sector 
collective bargaining interest impasse resolution and 
selected for the panel of labor arbitrators submitted by 
the State Board of Education [Id. ss (1) (a)]. If any 
vacancy occurs on the panel, the governor shall act 
within forty days to fill such vacancy (Sect. 4 - 19). 
Additionally, persons serving on the panel shall serve
r r
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without compensation but shall receive a per diem fee 
[Id. ss (1) (c)3.
When impasse in negotiations results, either party 
may submit issues in dispute to the commissioner for 
mediation if no agreement is reached one hundred ten 
days prior to the budget submission date [Id. ss (1)
(b)]. Mediators are to be chosen from a panel of 
mediators selected by the State Board of Education or 
from outside such panel if mutually agreed by the 
parties [Id. ss (1) (b)]. Mediators receive a per diem 
rate and the parties share equally in the cost of 
mediation. The mediator shall not disclose confidential 
information in the course of mediation unless the party 
making such communication waives such privilege. The 
commissioner may recommend a basis for settlement but it 
is not binding on the parties and such recommendation 
shall be made twenty-five days after the day on which 
mediation begins [Id. ss (1) (b)].
On the fourth day next following the end of the 
mediation session or on the eighty-fifth day prior to 
the budget submission date, whichever is sooner, the 
commissioner shall order the parties to report their 
settlement or the name of the single arbitrator mutually 
selected by them or the name of the arbitrator selected 
by each of them. Arbitrators selected by the parties 
will then select a third arbitrator to represent the
F  '
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public interests [1987 Conn. Acts 206, (1) (c)]. If the 
parties do not select a third arbitrator within five 
days after party arbitrators have been selected, the 
commissioner shall select the third arbitrator [Id. ss 
(1) (c)]. Whenever a panel of three arbitrators is 
selected, the chairperson of such panel shall be the 
representative of the public interests [Id. ss (c) (1)].
The chairperson or single arbitrator sets the date, 
time and place for the hearing to be held in the school 
district between the seventh and the fifteenth day, 
inclusive, giving written notice of that information to 
the parties in dispute at least five days prior to the 
hearing. At the hearing each party shall have full 
opportunity to submit all relevant evidence, introduce 
relevant documents and written material, and to argue on 
behalf of its positions [Id. ss (2)].
The hearing may be continued but in the event shall 
be concluded within twenty-five days after its 
commencement [Id. ss (3)] and a written decision shall 
be rendered within twenty days, signed by a majority of 
the arbitrators, including a narrative (written by the 
chairperson) explaining the evaluation by the 
arbitrators. One copy shall be filed with the 
commissioner, each town clerk in the school district 
involved, and the board of education and organization 
which are parties in dispute [Id. ss (4)].
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The decision is final and binding and the written 
decision shall incorporate those items of agreement the 
parties have reached prior to its issuance. The 
arbitrator/arbitrators shall resolve separately each 
individual issue disputed by accepting the last best 
offer of either of the parties and the decision of the 
arbitrators or the single arbitrator shall not be 
subject to rejection by the legislative body of the 
local or regional school district or by referendum. The 
parties shall pay the fee of the arbitrator selected by 
or for them and share equally the fee of the third 
arbitrator or the single arbitrator and all other costs 
incidental to the arbitration [Id. ss (4)].
Decisions of the panel or single arbitrator are 
subject to judicial review upon the filing by a party to 
the arbitration within thirty days following receipt of 
a final decision to vacate or modify such decision in 
the superior court. The superior court after hearing 
may vacate or modify the decision if substantial rights 
of a party have been prejudiced because such a decision 
is: (A) In violation of constitutional or statutory
provisions; (B) in excess of the statutory authority of 
the panel; (C) made upon unlawful procedure; (D) 
affected by other error of law; (E) clearly erroneous in 
view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence 
on the whole record; or, (F) arbitrary or capricious or
F '
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c h a r a c t e r i z e d  b y  a b u s e  o r  d i s c r e t i o n  o r  c l e a r l y  
u n w a r r a n t e d  e x e r c i s e  o f  d i s c r e t i o n  L i d .  s s  ( 7 ) ] .
Finally, under the current legislation the 
commissioner and the arbitrator/arbitrators shall have 
the same power and duties as the board under section 31 
- 108 for the purposes of mediation or arbitration 
pursuant to section (7) (d), and subsection (c) of 
section 10 - 153d and provisions in section 31 - 108 
with respect to procedure, jurisdiction of the superior 
court, witnesses and penalities shall apply.
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CHAPTER 4 
Research and Methodology
The following segment of the research will define 
the types of data that were collected and the procedures 
used to analyze the data. The first section of the 
analysis covered statistical questions pertaining to the 
first six years, 1979-80 through 1984-85, under 
Connecticut's compulsory arbitration statute for public 
school teachers [1979 Conn. Acts 405 (Reg. Sess.)]. The 
second section included questions that constituted the 
primary basis for interviews that were conducted with 
various individuals who were involved with the 
compulsory arbitration procedure in Connecticut.
The following research questions A through H, 
examined numerical data on the compulsory arbitration 
process from the state of Connecticut for the years 
1979-80 through 1984-85. Numerical data was obtained 
from the Connecticut Department of Education by the 
researcher during trips to the Department in Hartford, 
Connecticut. (See Appendix B for complete proof). In 
reviewing each of the questions, information is provided 
on how and from what sources data was collected.
57
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Information also includes the types of analyses that 
were performed on the data.
Research Hypothesis; That legislated compulsory (final- 
offer interest) arbitration fosters collective 
bargaining in public education.
Question A : Has there been a change in the number of
times that parties have used compulsory arbitration to 
settle impasse disputes since the passage of legislation 
providing for compulsory arbitration?
Data on the number of times compulsory arbitration 
was utilized for the years 1979-80 through 1984-85 was 
obtained from the Connecticut Department of Education.
The data was analyzed using a Chi square test for the 
six years being examined. The nonparametric Chi square 
test was chosen as the means of analysis for Question A 
because the procedure deals with frequency counts, in 
this instance the number of times compulsory arbitration 
was used for the years 1979-80 through 1984-85.
The null hypothesis for Question A states that, 
"There will be no significant difference in the number 
of times that compulsory arbitration was used during the 
1979-80 through 1984-85 period." Level of significance 
was placed at the .05 level. If the level of 
significance exceeded .05 the null hypothesis was
F   ~
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rejected.
Results were also examined to determine if 
"chilling” of the bargaining process was evidenced by 
the parties' unwillingness to attempt bargaining and 
immediately initiate a request for compulsory 
arbitration.
Question B : Has there been a change in the number of
collective bargaining agreements settled without the use 
of any impasse procedure since passage of legislation 
providing for compulsory arbitration?
Data on the number of collective bargaining 
agreements negotiated and the level of the process at 
which they were settled was obtained from the 
Connecticut Department of Education for the years 1979- 
80 through 1984-85.
A Chi square was conducted on this data for each of 
the six years analyzed. This data also interrelated 
with Question A in attempting to determine if reliance 
on the compulsory arbitration procedure grew, remained 
constant or lessened over time.
The null hypothesis for Question B states that,
"There will be no significant difference in the number 
of times that contracts were settled without the use of 
an impasse procedure during the 1979-80 through 1984-85 
period." Level of significance was placed at the .05
F  .......
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level. A significance exceeding the .05 level resulted 
in a rejection of the null hypothesis.
Question C : Has there been a change in the average
number of issues taken to arbitration from one year to 
the next since the passage of legislation providing for 
compulsory arbitration?
Data on the number of issues taken to impasse in 
each compulsory arbitration procedure was obtained for 
the years 1979-80 through 1984-85 from the Connecticut 
Department of Education.
A t test was performed on the data concerning the 
average number of issues taken to arbitration to 
determine the frequency of reliance on the process. The 
null hypothesis for Question C states that, "There will 
be no significant difference in the average number of 
issues taken to impasse for the years 1979-80 through 
1984-85." The level of significance was set at .05. A 
significance greater than .05 resulted in rejection of 
the null hypothesis.
Question D : Have more negotiation impasses been settled
at the preliminary step in the impasse procedure 
(mediation), rather than continuing to compulsory 
arbitration since passage of legislation providing for 
compulsory arbitration?
w ..
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Statistical data on the number of times mediation 
resulted in the settlement of impasse disputes was 
obtained from the Connecticut Department of Education 
for the years 1979-80 through 1984-85.
A Chi square test was performed on the data to 
determine if any significant differences could be 
determined when examining the use of mediation or 
arbitration as the final step in the impasse procedure.
The null hypothesis for Question D stated that, 
"There is no significant difference in the number of 
impasses being settled at the preliminary step of 
mediation in the impasse procedure." The level of 
significance was set at .05 and the null hypothesis was 
rejected if the level of significance exceeded .05.
Question E ; Can a pattern be determined in the usage 
rates of compulsory arbitration over the first six year 
following the statute's enactment?
Data for the usage rates of compulsory arbitration 
for Connecticut's public school teachers was obtained 
from the Connecticut Department of Education for the 
years 1979-80 through 1984-85. In comparing the 
statistics for each proceeding year, the data was 
examined to determine if a trend appeared to be 
developing over the years of compulsory arbitration's 
usage in Connecticut's public education sector. In
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determining whether any trends had developed with 
compulsory arbitration's usage, the data attempted to 
ascertain if a narcotic effect was evidenced by the use 
of compulsory arbitration over the six year period.
Question F : Is one type of issue taken to compulsory
arbitration more often than any other?
Data for the type of issue taken to compulsory 
arbitration was obtained from arbitration awards that 
were on file at the Connecticut Department of Education 
for the 1979-80 through 1984-85 period. Categories of 


























Initially an analysis of variance was
determine if any statistically significant differences 
occurred. When a difference occurred, the post hoc 
Least Significant Difference (LSD) test was performed to 
determine between what areas the differences occurred. 
The null hypothesis for Question F was that, "There is 
no significant difference in the area of issue being 
arbitrated for the years 1979-80 through 1984-85."
Level of significance was placed at the .05 level. 
Significance exceeding the .05 level resulted in 
rejection of the null hypothesis.
Question G ; Did arbitrators rule for the board or the 
association's position more often in compulsory 
arbitration decisions over the six year period following 
enactment of legislation providing for compulsory 
arbitration?
F T
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Data for the years 1979-80 through 1984-85 was 
obtained from the Connecticut Department of Education.
A t test was performed on the data for each of the six 
years analyzed and also for the six year period in 
total.
The null hypothesis for Question G states that,
"There is no significant difference in the number of 
times an arbitrator(s) decided in favor of a particular 
party in compulsory arbitration decisions during the 
1979-80 through 1984-85 period." Level of significance 
was placed at the .05 level with a significance above 
the .05 level resulting in rejection of the null 
hypothesis.
Question H : Is the category of the issue of impasse
independent of the arbitrator's deciding in favor of 
management or the union?
Data for the arbitral decision and category of 
issue for arbitration was obtained from the Connecticut 
Department of Education for the years 1979-80 through 
1984-85. An anlaysis of variance was performed on the 
data to determine if the area of issue for arbitration 
correlated with the party in whose favor the arbitrator 
decided. An analysis of variance was used to determine 
if the category of issue differed significantly in 
arbitral decisions and whether the categories interacted
F   .
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significantly with one another. When a difference was 
found, the Least Significant Difference (LSD) post hoc 
test was performed to determine where the differences 
occurred.
The null hypothesis for Question H stated that,
"The category of the issue of impasse is not significant 
in relation to the party in whose favor the arbitrator 
decides." The level of significance was set at the .05 
level. A significance greater than .05 resulted in 
rejection of the null hypothesis.
A second set of research questions concentrated on 
how the arbitration procedure was perceived by those 
individuals involved with the process for public school 
teachers in Connecticut.
Questions were answered through responses to 
interviews which were conducted as the second part of 
this research.
Question I: Has the Connecticut Education Association
shown satisfaction with the use of compulsory 
arbitration for the resolution of interest disputes for 
public school teachers in Connecticut by continuing to 
support legislation for compulsory arbitration?
Question J ; Has the Connecticut Department of Education 
shown satisfaction with the use of compulsory 
arbitration for the resolution of interest disputes for
I F  7------------- ' '
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public school teachers in Connecticut by continuing to 
support legislation for compulsory arbitration?
Question K : Has the Connecticut School Board
Association shown satisfaction with the use of 
compulsory arbitration for the resolution of interest 
disputes for public school teachers in Connecticut by 
continuing to support legislation for compulsory 
arbitration?
Question L : Has the American Federation of Teachers
shown satisfaction with the use of compulsory 
arbitration for the resolution of interest disputes for 
public school teachers in Connecticut by continuing to 
support legislation for compulsory arbitration?
Question M : Have members of the arbitration panel shown
satisfaction with the use of compulsory arbitration for 
the resolution of interest disputes for public school 
teachers in Connecticut by continuing to support 
legislation for compulsory arbitration?
Question N : Have any of the groups in Questions I
through M shown any dissatisfaction with the legislation 
for compulsory arbitration for public school teachers in 
Connecticut?
1. What are the factors causing the 
dissatisfaction?
2. What recommendations or amendments would they 
suppor t?
F  '
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A set of eight interview questions were utilized to 
answer Questions I through N . The questions were aimed 
at determining an individual1s perception of the 
compulsory arbitration procedure including satisfaction 
or dissatisfaction with the procedure in Connecticut, 
the reasons for this satisfaction or dissatisfaction and 
recommendations or amendments that the individual made 
concerning the compulsory arbitration legislation.
The questions were presented to the individuals 
through telephone interviews. The questions were 
incorporated into an interview guide. The guide had 
each question printed in it, along with sufficient space 
for the interviewer to write down the responses of each 
subject.
The format for the interview was semi structured. 
First, questions that were structured were presented to 
the subject. These questions were followed by open- 
ended questions which allowed the subject to elaborate 
on his or her responses.
Although individuals being interviewed were 
familiar with the compulsory arbitration process, 
questions did not include jargon or technical terms that 
might be unfamiliar or cloud the subject's responses in 
any way. Questions did not include negative wording to 
avoid misinterpretation of the questions and leading or 
biased questions were avoided so that subjects were not
F
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given hints as to how the researcher might prefer they 
answer.
Copies of the aforementioned questions were sent to 
the subjects prior to the interview so that they had 
sufficient time to review the questions. This was also 
done so that any additional responses to the interview 
questions could be forwarded to the researcher by the 
subjects.
Prior to the actual interviewing, the researcher 
conducted a piloting of the interview questions with 
individuals from Pennsylvania who were familiar with 
labor law and the arbitration procedure in that state. 
Although it would have been more desirable to do a pilot 
with individuals involved with the procedure in 
Connecticut, the number of individuals on the 
arbitration panel was relatively small and the 
researcher wanted to be able to include all responses 
from individuals on that panel as part of the research.
The following questions were answered in relation 
to Connecticut's legislation which provides compulsory 
interest arbitration for the resolution of interest 
disputes for public school teachers.
1. How many years have you been involved in the 
compulsory arbitration process in Connecticut?
a. In what capacity?
F  r
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b. Approximately how many compulsory arbitration 
procedures have you been directly involved in?
2. What occurrences do you believe were responsible for 
the move to enact legislation for compulsory 
arbitration?
3. What is your opinion of the present compulsory 
arbitration legislation? (a) strengths, (b) weaknesses,
(c) effectiveness, (d) suggestions for change?
4. What is your opinion of the availability of 
compulsory arbitration for settling impasse disputes?
5. How have the bargaining parties responded to 
compulsory arbitration as a means of settling impasse 
disputes?
6. Given your experience, how would you evaluate the 
use of compulsory arbitration vs. mediation for settling 
impasse disputes?
7. What unanticipated affects of the legislation have 
manifest themselves since initiation of the compulsory 
arbitration procedure?
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8. What is your overall assessment of the practice of 
compulsory arbitration as you have experienced it?
Should it be (a) continued, (b) modified, (c) 
eliminated?
Assumptions and Limitations
The following were assumptions that the researcher 
made when collecting data for the study. They were:
1. That individuals gave honest responses to the
questions posed in the interviews.
2. The statistical data obtained from state agencies 
was accurate.
The study also had the following limitations:
1. Data will include information from only the state of 
Connecticut.
2. The study covers a period of six years.
3. Some individuals who were involved in the compulsory
arbitration process were not available for an interview.
4. The group of individuals interviewed was relatively 
small.
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Chapter 5 
Data Analysis
The following section will show a breakdown of the 
issues arbitrated in districts utilizing compulsory 
arbitration for the years 1979-1980, 1980-1981, 1981- 
1982, 1982-1983, 1983-1984 and 1984-1985. This is done 
according to the category of issue arbitrated and how 
many issues were decided in favor of the board and the 
association. (See Appendix B for complete proof). This 
information, combined with data on the number of 
bargaining agreements and the way in which those 
agreements were made (without any impasse, in mediation 
or in arbitration) over the six year period, will be 
used to analyze Questions A through H of the research 
project.
Questions A, B and D deal with the various 
procedures available for coming to contract agreement in 
Connecticut. The three are: (1) Settlement without the 
use of an impasse procedure, (2) settlement through 
mediation and (3) settlement through compulsory 
arbitration. Data concerning the number of public 
school teacher contracts negotiated, the number settled
71
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without impasse, those settled in mediation and those 
settled in arbitration were obtained from the 
Connecticut Department of Education and are shown in 
Table 1 for each of the six years being studied.
Table 1
PROCEDURES USED TO SETTLE CONTRACTS 
FOR THE YEARS 1979-80 THROUGH 1984-85
79-80 80-81 81-82 82-83 83-84 84-85
# to be negotiated 84 86 93 95 101 100
No impasse 25 29 31 19 32 22
Mediation 20 33 31 39 46 50
Arbitration 39 24 31 37 23 28
A series of Chi square tests were performed on the 
data in Table 1 to answer Questions A, B and D. The 
formula for the Chi square test used to answer Questions 
A, B and D when combining all six years is:
CP; ~ e-,)* 
e.i
The Chi square formula used when comparing one year 
to the year following it is:
, n (ad - be)
-7 = -------------------
(a+c) (a+b) (b+d) (c+d)
Question A asks if there has been a change in the 
number of times that parties have gone to compulsory
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arbitration to settle impasse disputes since passage of 
legislation providing for compulsory arbitration?
When comparing the six years combined, Chi square 
at the‘=<.05 with 5 degrees of freedom would have to 
produce a value that was greater than 11.070 in order to 
denote that a statistically significant difference 
occurred. The test value for the six year total was 
15.466 which indicated that a significant difference 
occurred. The second set of Chi square tests were 
performed comparing the data on a year to year basis.
The results of those tests are shown in Table 2.
Table 2
RESULTS OF CHI SQUARE 2X2 CONTINGENCY TABLE ON THE NUMBER 
OF TIMES COMPULSORY ARBITRATION HAS BEEN USED TO 
COME TO A CONTRACT AGREEMENT
Year 1 to 2 (79-80 to 80-81) 6.250*
Year 2 to 3 (80-81 to 81-82) 0.180
Year 3 to 4 (81-82 to 82-83) 0.642
Year 4 to 5 (82-83 to 83-84) 6.030*
Year 5 to 6 (83-84 to 84-85) 0.725
(note: 3.841, df = 1, .05)
*significant at .05
In testing for statistical significance from year 
to year a significant difference was not found for Year 
2 to 3, Year 3 to 4 or Year 5 to 6. The null hypothesis
¥ ------
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that, "There will be no significant difference in the 
number of times that compulsory arbitration is used, 
from one year to the next" would be retained for these 
years.
A significant difference did occur between Year 1 
to 2 and Year 4 to 5. This would mean a rejection of 
the null hypothesis, and acceptance of the alternative 
hypothesis that, "There is a significant difference in 
the number of times compulsory arbitration was used" for 
the years 1979-80 to 80-81 and 1983-84 to 84-85.
Question B used the same summation formula for the 
six year total and the same Chi square test for the year 
to year comparisons.
Question B asks if there has been a change in the 
number of collective bargaining agreements settled 
without the use of any impasse procedure since passage 
of legislation providing for compulsory arbitration.
To compare Chi square at the .05 with 5 degrees 
of freedom, the test would have to produce a value 
greater than 11.070 to denote that a statistically 
significant difference existed. The test value was 
8.329 showing non significance and acceptance of the 
null hypothesis for the six year total.
Next, the second set of Chi square tests were 
performed on the data using a 2X2 contingency table to 
test for any significant differences that may have
F
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occurred on a year to year basis. Those results are 
shown in Table 3.
Table 3
RESULTS OF CHI SQUARE 2X2 CONTINGENCY TABLE ON THE 
NUMBER OF TIMES NO IMPASSE PROCEDURE HAS BEEN USED
TO COME TO A CONTRACT AGREEMENT
Year 1 to 2 (1979-80 to 80-81) 0.307
Year 2 to 3 (1980-81 to 81-82) 0.00301
Year 3 to 4 (1981-82 to 82-83) 4.279*
Year 4 to 5 (1982-83 to 83-84) 3.471
Year 5 to 6 (1983-84 to 84-85) 2.398
(note:]2^= 3.841, df = 1, .05)
*significant at .05
In testing for statistical significance from year 
to year, none was found for the years (Year 1 to 2, Year 
2 to 3, Year 4 to 5 and Year 5 to 6). Therefore, the 
null hypothesis that, "There has not been a change in 
the number of collective bargaining agreements settled 
without the use of an impasse procedure since passage of 
legislation for compulsory arbitration" would be 
accepted for the six year total and also for the above 
mentioned years. A significant diference did occur 
between Year 3 and 4. Therefore, an alternative 
hypothesis of, "There has been a change in the number of 
collective bargaining agreements settled without the use
¥  :  • '  ■ '
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of an impasse procedure", would be accepted for the 
period from 1981-82 to 1982-83.
Question D then asks, "Have more negotiation 
impasses been settled at a preliminary step in the 
impasse procedure (mediation) rather than continuing to 
compulsory arbitration since passage of legislation 
providing for compulsory arbitration?
The summation formula was used to determine a Chi 
square value for the six year totals. To compare Chi 
square at°<..05 with 5 degrees of freedom, the test 
would have to produce a value greater than 11.070 to 
denote statistical significance. The test value was 
3.841 indicating no statistically significant difference 
in the use of mediation and arbitration as means of 
settling impasse disputes over the total six year 
period.
The second set of Chi square tests were performed 
using a 2X2 contingency table to test for any possible 
statistically significant differences from year to year. 
Those results are shown in Table 4.
Table 4
RESULTS OF CHI SQUARE 2X2 CONTINGENCY TABLE ON THE 
NUMBER OF TIMES MEDIATION/ARBITRATION HAS BEEN USED 
TO COME TO CONTRACT AGREEMENT 
Year 1 to 2 (1979-80 to 80-81) 6.728*
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Year 2 to 3 (1980-81 to 81-82) 0.745
Year 3 to 4 (1981-82 to 82-83)
Year 4 to 5 (1982-83 to 83-84)




(note: = 3.841, df = 1, << .05)
♦significant at .05
Testing from one year to the next shows no 
significant difference for the years Year 2 to 3, Year 3 
to 4, Year 4 to 5 and Year 5 to 6. The null hypothesis 
that, "There is no significant difference in the number 
of impasses settled at the preliminary step of mediation 
in the impasse procedure" is retained for the 
abovementioned years. A significant difference was 
found between Year 1 to 2. In this instance, the 
alternative hypothesis of, "There is a significant 
difference in the number of impasses settled at the 
preliminary step of mediation in the impasse procedure" 
would apply for the years 1979-80 to 80-81.
Question C asks if there had been a change in the 
average number of issues taken to arbitration from one 
year to the next since passage of legislation providing 
for compulsory arbitration?
The following t test was used comparing Year 1 to 
2, Year 2 to 3, Year 3 to 4 and so on:
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Results of the t tests are found in Table 5.
Table 5
T TEST RESULTS OP THE MEAN NUMBER OP ISSUES TAKEN TO 
ARBITRATION FOR THE YEARS 1979-80 THROUGH 1984-85
Year t value df P
1 to 2 (79-80 to 80-81) 1.7091 55.3 0.0930
2 to 3 (80-81 to 81-82) 1.0470 32.4 0.3029
3 to 4 (81-82 to 82-83) -2.2384 48.9 0.0298*
4 to 5 (82-83 to 83-84) 1.7556 56.5 0.0846
*significant at .05
No statistically significant difference was found 
at the ̂ .05 level for Year 1 to 2, Year 2 to 3, or Year 
4 to 5, and the null hypothesis that, "There is no 
significant difference between the mean number of issues 
taken to arbitration" would be retained. A significant
F    “ '
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difference was found from Year 3 to 4. This would 
result in accepting the alternative hypothesis that, 
"There is a significant difference between the mean 
number of issues taken to arbitration" for the years 
1981-82 to 82-83.
A different type of t test had to be performed on 
the results from Year 5 to 6 because of equal variances. 
The t test used to compare those years is:
In Year 5 to 6, the t value was -0.0433 with 49 
degrees of freedom and p = 0.9657. In order to be 
statistically significant, the p value would have to be 
less than .05. Results show that there was no 
statistically significant difference, so the null 
hypothesis would also be retained for the years 1983-84 
to 84-85.
In Question E, districts were examined to determine 
if a trend seemed to be developing with the use of the 
arbitration procedure. Table 6 shows a breakdown of how 
many districts went to arbitration and repeated it after 
an initial experience with the process.
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FREQUENCY OF DISTRICTS UTILIZING ARBITRATION FROM 
1979-80 THROUGH 1984-85
Times to Year of first arbitration
arbitration 79-80 80-81 81-82 82-83 83-84 84-85
1 9 8 8 7 3 7
2 12 9 9 1 1 0
3 15 4 2 0 0 0
4 2 0 0 0 0 0
5 1 0 0 0 0 0
Observation of the data indicates that no trend 
appears to be evident in the year to year use of the 
arbitration procedure.
Question F, asks if one type of issue is taken to 
compulsory arbitration more often than any other. Table 
7 shows each of the twenty-three issue areas, and gives 
totals for the number of times each area was arbitrated 
over the six year period.
Table 7
TOTAL NUMBER OF ISSUES ARBITRATED FOR EACH AREA 
FOR THE YEARS 1979-80 THROUGH 1984-85 
Issue Year
79-80 80-81 81-82 82-83 83-84 84-85 
Salary 63 22 28 51 31 29
F-------------------  " '
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Salary scale 72 12 2 30 10 16
Medical insurance 46 14 19 59.5 10 25
Dental insurance 22 9 6 21.5 5 5
Life insurance 14 6 2 8 1 2
Ex tracurricular 28 7 9 24 13 4
Athletic 27 6 7 16.5 5 5
Severance pay 3 0 2 2 1 0
Dept. head/Co-or. 25 8 7 18.5 12 3
Sum. sch/homebound 40 8 5 20 7 1
Early retirement 7 5 0 11 1 8
Longevity 11 2 3 12 4 7
Assignments 27 6 4 5 2 6
Evaluation 6 1 3 2 1 2
Work day/year 70 17 12 42 23 26
Class size 10 5 2 8 1 12
Leaves 55 27 18 24 4 6
Reduction/recall 15 7 13 27 2 3
Curriculum 0 1 1 0 1 0
Duration 13 3 5 4 2 5
Dues deduction 16 14 12 7 1 1
Grievance 45 6 0 12 1 0
Miscellaeous 49 16 16 31 13 21
A one way analysis of variance was performed on the 
data for the totals for the six year period to determine 
if there was a statistically significant difference 
between the type of issue and how often that issue went
W
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to arbitration. An F value of 4.23 was found with p = 
0.001. Results were found to be significant, so a post 
hoc Least Significant Difference (LSD) test of multiple 
comparisons was performed to determine between which 
issues the difference did occur. The LSD was chosen 
because it controls the Type I comparisonwise error 
rate.
Statistical significant differences were found 
between the following issues:
The number of times that salary was arbitrated was 
significant when compared to the frequency of use for 
eighteen other issues which included, dental insurance, 
life insurance, extracurricular, athletic, severance 
pay, department head/co-ordinator, summer 
school/homebound, early retirement, longevity, 
assignments, evaluations, class size, leaves, reduction 
and recall, curriculum, duration, dues deduction and 
grievance.
A significant difference was also found between the 
number of times that workday/workyear was an issue of 
arbitration when compared to seventeen areas which 
included, dental insurance, life insurance, 
extracurricular, athletic, severance pay, department 
head/co-ordinator, summer school/homebound, early 
retirement, longevity, assignments, evaluations, class 
size, reduction and recall, curriculum, duration, dues
F
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deduction and grievance.
Significant differences occurred between the 
frequency with which medical insurance was arbitrated 
and the areas of dental insurance, life insurance, 
extracurricular, athletic, severance pay, department 
head/co-ordinator, summer school/homebound, early 
retirement, longevity, assignments, evaluations, class 
size, reduction and recall, curriculum, duration, dues 
deduction and grievance.
Significant differences also occurred between 
miscellaneous issues and the areas of life insurance, 
severance pay, early retirement, longevity, assignments, 
evaluations, class size, curriculum, duration and dues 
deduction. The number of times that leaves of absence 
was an issue for arbitration was found to be significant 
to the areas of life insurance, severance pay, early 
retirement, longevity, assignments, evaluations, class 
size, curriculum duration, dues deduction, athletic and 
grievance.
An alternative hypothesis of, "There is a 
significant difference in the area of issue and the 
number of times it is arbitrated" would be accepted for 
the abovementioned areas. All other comparisons between 
issues were found to be non significant at <=<.05, 
retaining the null hypothesis that, "There is no 
significant difference in the area of issue and the
F  '
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number of times it is arbitrated."
Question G asks if arbitrators rule for the board 
or the association's position more often in compulsory 
arbitration decisions over the six year period following 
enactment of legislation providing for compulsory 
arbitration.
Data for the total number of issues decided in 
favor of the board and the association for each of the 
years being examined is found in Table 8.
Table 8









A t test was performed on the data for individual 
years and the total six year period to test for 
statistical significance. The formula used was the same 
as that used to test for statistical significance in 
Question C. The results of that test are found in Table
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T TEST RESULTS ON ARBITRATOR DECISIONS FOR 







(note: a t value of less than°<.05 was needed to reject
the null hypothesis)
*significant at .05
Results of the t tests found that there was no 
statistically significant difference for the years 1979- 
80, 1980-81, 1981-82, 1982-83, 1983-84 and 1984-85. 
Additionally, the t test combining the six year total 
produced a t value of 0.6686 and showed no significant 
difference. These results would mean the null 
hypothesis that, "There is no significant difference in 
the number of times an arbitrator decided in favor of a 
particular party in compulsory arbitration procedures" 
would be retained for all of the years examined.
Finally, Question H examined whether the category of 
the issue of impasse was independent of the arbitrators'
w
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deciding in favor of the board or the association. 
Table 10 shows the number of times each area of issue 
was decided for the board and the association for the 
years 1979-80 through 1984-85.
Table 10
YEARLY TOTALS OF ISSUES DECIDED FOR THE BOARD (B) 
AND THE ASSOCIATION (A)
1979--80 1980--81
(B) (A) (B) (A)
1. Salary 17 49 8 14
2. Salary scale 40 32 7 5
3. Medical insurance 23 23 8 6
4. Dental insurance 11 11 7 2
5. Life insurance 9 5 3 3
6. Ex tracurricular 16 12 5 2
7. Athletic 22 5 4 2
8. Severance pay 2 1 0 0
9. Dept, head/co.ordinator 23 2 3 5
10. Summer school/homebound 26 14 3 5
11. Early retirement 7 0 5 0
12. Longevity 8 3 2 0
13. Assignments 14 13 3 3
14. Evaluations 4 2 0 1
15. Workday/year 61 9 9 8
16. Class size 9 1 5 0
F ' .
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17. Leaves of absence 32 23 15 12
18. Reduction and recall 6 9 6 1
19. Curriculum 0 0 1 0
20. Duration 4 9 2 1
to • Dues deduction 12 4 6 8
22. Grievance 15 30 3 3
23. Miscellaneous 24 25 10 6
1981-82 1982-83 1983-84 1984-85
(B) (A) (B) (A) (B) (A) (B) (A)
1. 8 20 11 40 7 24 4 25
2. 1 1 16 14 1 9 9 7
3. 14 5 32 27.5 4 6 12 13
4. 5 1 11 10.5 5 0 0 5
5. 2 0 7 1 1 0 1 1
6. 5 4 21 3 10 3 1 3
7. 3 4 9.5 7 3 2 2 3
8. • 1 1 2 0 1 0 0 0
9. 6 1 13.5 5 9 3 2 1
10. 3 2 11 9 3 4 0 1
11. 0 0 8 3 1 0 7 1
12. 1 2 8 4 4 0 5 2
13. 3 1 1 4 2 0 6 0
14. 0 3 2 0 0 1 0 2
15. 7 5 24 18 15 8 16 10
16. 2 0 8 0 1 0 11 1
17. 8 10 10 14 2 2 4 2
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18. 2 11 12 15 1 1 2 1
19. 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
20. 2 3 1 3 1 1 0 5
21. 1 11 1 6 1 0 0 1
22. 0 0 2 10 0 1 0 0
23. 11 5 18 13 8 5 12 21
Initially, a one way analysis of 'variance was
performed to determine if any statistically significant 
difference occurred between the area of issue and the 
arbitral decision (board or association). Results 
showed an F value of 4.23 with p = 0.001. This 
indicated that a statistically significant difference 
did exist. The Least Significant Difference (LSD) test 
for multiple comparisons was then performed to determine 
where a decision for the board or association was 
effected by the type of issue being arbitrated. A 
difference was found to exist when two issues were 
arbitrated, salary and workday/year.
Therefore, the alternative hypothesis that, "There 
is a statistically significant difference in the number 
of times arbitrators decided in favor of a particular 
party in compulsory arbitration procedures" would be 
accepted for the areas of salary and workday/year for 
the six year period being examined with decisions in the 
area of salary being favorable for the association and 
those for workday/year being favorable for the board.
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Interviews were conducted with nineteen individuals 
who were presently serving as arbitrators for public 
education disputes in Connecticut. In addition to the 
arbitrators, persons representing organizations directly 
involved with the compulsory arbitration process in 
Connecticut Department of Education, Connecticut 
Education Association (CEA), Connecticut Association of 
Boards of Education (CABE) and the American Federation 
of Teachers (AFT) were interviewed. The interviews 
consisted of questions that dealt with the individuals' 
perceptions of the process and how it has worked since 
its inception in 1979.
Initially, individuals were contacted to see if 
they would be willing to participate. Upon agreement to 
participate, a set of interview questions were forwarded 
to the participants for their review prior to the actual 
interview. Interviews were conducted by telephone 
because of distance and the scheduling of convenient 
times for the participants. The interview consisted 
of eight questions with interviews lasting from 20 
minutes to one hour and 15 minutes in length.
The eight interview questions will first be 
examined individually in regard to how they were 
answered by members of the arbitration panel. Members
W  '
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of the panel included individuals representing the 
exclusive interests of boards of education, individuals 
representing the exclusive interests of employee 
organizations and individuals representing the interests 
of the public. There were 21 arbitrators sitting on the 
panel at the time of the interviews, with seven 
representing each of the three groups. Two of the 21 
individuals were unable to participate in the interview 
process.
After looking at the responses on a question by 
question basis, conclusions will be incorporated into 
the final chapter of the study.
Question # 1: How many years have you been involved in
the compulsory arbitration process in Connecticut? In 
what capacity? Approximately how many compulsory 
arbitration procedures have you been directly involved 
in?
The number of years that individuals had sat on the 
arbitration panel varied from two years to eight years, 
(since the inception of the process in 1979). Each of 
the three representative groups had individuals who were 
on the initial board appointed by Governor Ella Grasso 
in 1979. Others had been appointed at later dates due 
to openings on the panel which had resulted from deaths.
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failure to be reappointed to the panel or individual 
withdrawal from the panel.
Some individuals had taken part in over 100 
hearings, a few had participated in only a limited 
number of hearings and many had taken part in 20 to 50 
hearings. Numbers here would also be effected by the 
number of years an individual had served on the panel.
(Note: The following responses were made by arbitrators
representing the three groups (public interests, boards 
of education, and employee organization). Responses 
will be noted from each of the arbitrators but not for 
every question asked.
Question # 2: What occurrences do you believe were
responsible for the move to enact legislation for 
compulsory arbitration?
Every respondent mentioned the occurrence of 
previous teacher strikes (strikes were and still are 
illegal in Connecticut) that had taken place in 
Connecticut, and that the general feeling was that 
something had to be done to eliminate those strikes.
Major strikes had occurred in a number of towns and 
cities, most notably New Haven and Bridgeport. The 
Bridgeport strike was noted by many as being the "straw
W  .....
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that broke the camel's back."
When responding to the question on what occurrences 
were believed responsible for the move to enact 
compulsory arbitration legislation, some arbitrator 
statements were:
— "I think they just wanted to prevent strikes."
— "Strikes. A strike before in Shelton, but one in 
Bridgeport that triggered it. Obviously, a lot of 
things went on before that. The attitude of collective 
bargaining was not good."
— "Primarily, teacher strikes, were the biggest thing, 
and the "impetus for this law." A number of teacher 
strikes in the 70's, mainly the strike in Bridgeport, 
where the daughter of the mayor was one of the teachers 
on strike. Needed finality to the process."
— In the late 70's there was a nasty strike in 
Bridgeport. Some teachers were put in the "slammer".
The result was "cloba" (compulsory last best offer 
binding arbitration)."
— "I think the immediate motivating act was the 
Bridgeport teachers' strike that resulted in the jailing 
of teachers, including many elderly teachers."
According to Department of Education statistics, 52 
teacher strikes have taken place in Connecticut from 
1946-47 through 1986-87. The majority of those strikes
W    -   ..
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took place during the 1970's. Bridgeport was the next 
to the last strike that had taken place in the state. A 
strike occurred in Southington during the 1979-80 
schoolyear. The strike occurred after the bill was 
accepted but was not covered by the act because contract 
negotiations had begun prior to enactment of the act.
The Bridgeport teachers' strike of 1978 brought 
national attention to the city of Bridgeport and its 
public school system when more than 200 teachers were 
jailed after their refusal to go back to work when 
contract negotiations with the city came to an impasse. 
The following gives a brief historical background of 
that strike.
In speaking with the Connecticut Education 
Association representative for the teachers of 
Bridgeport during the 1978 strike, the events that led 
up to the strike were the preceding contracts in which 
teachers did not feel that they were getting a 
reasonable wage. Two years prior to the strike in 
Bridgeport a strike vote had been taken but teachers did 
not strike because the city was in a financial crisis. 
During the present session of negotiations, after being 
denied a raise, teachers felt that the strike was their 
only recourse and that it was morally right. The major 
issues in dispute were salary and preparation time for 
elementary school teachers.
F   — .
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During this strike, 274 teachers were incarcerated 
for some period of time. The first incarcerations took 
place when the executive board and negotiations 
committee for the teacher organization were in court and 
asked to go back to work. When they said that they 
would not, they were handcuffed and taken to jail. The 
women were taken to Niantic (the only maximum security 
prison which accepted women and was located about one 
hour from Bridgeport). They were taken to Niantic, 
processed with other prisoners, given prison garb and 
taken to a dormitory section of the prison (which was 
located away from the other prisoners). The men were 
jailed at Whalley Avenue in New Haven.
The following day the executive board and 
negotiations committee were taken from maximum security 
and placed at Camp Hartell, a National Guard Camp 
outside of Windsor Lock, Connecticut and near Bradley 
Airport. The camp had previously been closed but was 
reopened and the individuals were placed under guard 
there.
At the same time that this was happening, a group 
of approximately 50 teachers were in court in 
Bridgeport. They too were asked to go back to work.
When they refused, they were handcuffed and sent to Camp 
Hartell. This second jailing is the one that hit the 
headlines with a picture of a "sixty-seven year old
w  ~
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elementary teacher being taken to jail in handcuffs".
The story received national media coverage.
There were additional jailings after this. The 
time spent in confinement varied from 13 days for the 
executive board and negotiations committee to lesser 
amounts for other groups taken to Camp Hartell. A total 
of 274 teachers were incarcerated for some time during 
the strike.
Negotiations were going on throughout this time 
period. Meanwhile, there were demonstrations by the 
Connecticut Education Association (CEA} with locals from 
throughout the state demonstrating at Camp Hartell 
daily.
Initially, there was an attempt to keep the schools 
open. They were opened for the first two days of the 
strike and then closed for its remainder.
Most of the negotiations were behind the scenes. 
Meetings took place with Governor Grasso and finally the 
State Labor Board intervened. Commissioner Reilly 
negotiated with the groups at the State Labor Board (a 
24 hour bargaining session) and after that settlement 
was reached.
When voting on the proposal, a vote was first taken 
by the teachers who were then incarcerated at Camp 
Hartell. If the terms were agreeable to them, a second 
vote was to take place with the remainder of the
F
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membership. One vote was taken at Camp Hartell and one 
vote was taken in Bridgeport. Finally, after a 48 hour 
non stop negotiations/voting session everyone, including 
those from Camp Hartell, met at Klein Memorial.
When the Bridgeport teachers look at the role their 
strike played in moving toward legislation for 
compulsory arbitration, they feel that at the time the 
strike vote was taken any proposed legislation for 
binding arbitration was the furtherest thing from their
minds. They were on strike because of the local
Bridgeport situation.
During and after the strike, community feelings for 
the teachers were positive. A rapport built up between
the community and the teachers, and in proceeding years
the groups worked together on issues of concern. The 
most difficult factor to be dealt with after the strike 
was the internal strife. Some asked, for example, "Why 
did I have to go to jail and you didn't?" Some 
individuals felt that they were put in jeopardy by going 
to jail, and others who didn't want to take the step 
still reaped the benefits. There are accordingly 
individuals who still have not returned to the 
mainstream as a result of that inner discord.
The climate of collective bargaining in Bridgeport 
changed as a result of the strike. The teacher 
organization went to binding arbitration for the three
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following contracts and the first time that settlement 
was reached between the parties since that time was 
during the 1986-87 negotiations. J. Rosenberg (personal 
communication, June 16, 1987).
Question #3: What is your opinion of the present
compulsory arbitration legislation? Strengths?
— "It seems sound and constitutional, and there has been 
no successful legal effort to eliminate the statute on 
the constitution."
— "It depends on what one wants to achieve. If one 
wants to achieve elimination of strikes, it does that.
It speeds up resolution."
— "All disputes get settled. No lost time. Gets rid of 
unreasonable demands."
— “When the law was enacted, it was done with firm 
timetables and it was tied into the budget process."
—  "It brought some labor peace. We do have closure to 
the process of collective bargaining, which has a 
positive impact on school boards' ability to budget."
— "I'm not sure that the legislation itself has 
strengths. The principle strength has not necessarily 
been the format but the fact that Connecticut used to 
have strikes and we haven't had any since the 
legislation was introduced."
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— "The ability to resolve disputes, that's its strength. 
Strengths are inherent in the process. The participants 
are well qualified. Now there is an attitude that we 
don't have to become enemies. If we don't resolve 
difficulties the arbitrators will. It takes pressure 
off of the parties."
— "It provides finality. An "escape valve" for both 
parties so that both can express themselves in a due 
process forum."
— "I think the greatest strength is that it is 
overwhelmingly accepted by the community itself."
Responses to the first part of the question which 
dealt with the strengths of compulsory arbitration 
legislation resulted in a number of different areas 
being addressed.
Arbitrators frequently mentioned the finality of 
the compulsory arbitration process. This finality or 
closure to an impasse provides boards of education with 
a contract prior to the budget submission date. 
Arbitrators also stated that the legislation has 
eliminated strikes and stalemates that interfere with 
the educational process. Time was a third factor that 
arbitrators spoke of, with a timetable and strict 
timelines speeding up the resolution process. Two 
interesting strengths that were found to be inherent in
F   “  '
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the process were the quality of those participating in 
the arbitration procedure and the acceptance of the 
procedure by the community.
Question # 3: What is your opinion of the present
compulsory arbitration legislation? Weaknesses?
—  "The short time frame for the arbitration process and 
a longer time for negotiations. There is 
procrastination down to the wire and then the arbitrator 
has to decide bing bing."
— "It does not provide home rule."
— "Compensation has increased dramatically. Also, a lot 
of managerial perogatives get eroded away. A self 
fulfilling prophecy in that all labor contracts have the 
same things."
— "Process may promote more uniformity than warranted by 
different situations."
— "Preserves the status quo and blocks innovation."
— "You have to give up something to get the process, 
"control", over the settlement. The decision is not 
made by the bargaining parties."
— "Time constraints. Everyone complains about 
restraints but they get the awards out. It is only a 
possible problem if you are doing a lot of them at the 
same time."
W  ..........
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— "Balancing with last best offer. Cases where neither 
offer "sits well" with the arbitration panel and they 
wish to come up with a compromise."
— "Weaknesses are perceived. Arbitrators wrote 
abbreviated awards and consequently required a statement 
of reasons. As presently constructed the law works 
well."
Many responses included references to timelines or 
time restrictions. Under the present procedure, 
arbitrators must come to a decision 20 days after the 
initial arbitration hearing, with the award (including 
narrative) completed five days thereafter. Some 
individuals had also mentioned a weakness that was 
previously in the law but had been rectified. That is, 
a statement of reasons as to why a decision is made for 
each issue, and what factors were used to come to that 
decision (narrative).
Arbitrators also note that compulsory arbitration 
takes away the teacher/board bargaining and gives the 
decision making to a third party rather than having the 
bargaining parties control their own destiny. Another 
limitation mentioned was the uniformity of contracts 
that has developed over time, with little innovation 
being adopted in the area of contract language.
F :
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Question # 3: What is your opinion of the present 
compulsory arbitration legislation? Effectiveness?
— "Basically, it works."
— "Number of arbitrations declining, except 1986 - 87 
Enhancement Act reopeners. Continued decline would 
indicate success."
— "Works out very well from the employees' point of 
view. Fills the gap that voluntary arbitration brings." 
— "One-hundred percent effective. Ends the impasse and 
there have been no teacher strikes in Connecticut since 
the binding arbitration law was enacted."
— "It's been effective if an object was to avoid 
strikes. We have had none since the legislation."
— "Modified somewhat because arbitrators are 
conservative. Initially, teacher unions rushing into 
binding arbitration; as reality set in we got into more 
collective bargaining."
Arbitrators felt that if an objective of the 
legislation was to prevent teacher strikes, it has 
indeed done so because none have occurred since 
enactment of the act. Its effectiveness is also 
conveyed by the fact that it works and fills the gap 
that existed with voluntary arbitration which was not 
mandated.
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Question # 3: What is your opinion of the present
compulsory arbitration legislation? Suggestions for 
change?
— "Statutory criteria tend to have effect of benefiting 
teacher unions. Basically, comparability factors look 
at what towns settled earlier and a domino effect 
occurs. Maybe certain criteria should be given 
priority."
— "Maybe more time for arbitration than for 
negotiations."
— "Where parties are in agreement stipulation should be 
mandated."
— "This year you were given three neutrals, each side 
gets to cross one off. I don't like that. You used to 
have two parties talk and jockey around and decide who 
you wanted as the third arbitrator. Now they give you 
three names and they all may be unacceptable." (note: 
This changed back to the two sides choosing the third 
arbitrator in June, 1987, after this interview was 
completed).
— "Law should be modified to allow legislative bodies of 
communities to have some input."
— "Relax time constraints."
— "None, except to make hours of the workday for 
teachers a mandatory subject for negotiations." (note:
F   '
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Hours became a mandatory item for bargaining in June,
1987, after this interview was completed).
— "I believe interim bargaining should be added to the 
act." (note: Interim bargaining became effective in
June, 1987, after this interview was completed).
— " A catchall is needed for something that doesn't fit 
into the other categories like "such other evidence 
deemed relevant by the arbitrators" when making a 
decision."
It is interesting to note that some of the areas 
that arbitrators had suggested for change actually were 
changed during the Legislature's June, 1987 session.
Those areas included the choosing of a third arbitrator, 
the inclusion of hours as a mandatory subject of 
bargaining and interim bargaining.
Arbitrators were also concerned with the strict 
timelines that must be adhered to once arbitration 
begins. Additional concerns that stipulated agreements 
should be mandated as such when the parties agree to 
them and that the factors used to determine an award be 
constructed to include an additional category which 
would allow arbitrators to include information that may 
be of great value although it might not specifically fit 
into one of the other criteria provided under the law, 
were also voiced. Finally, some individuals felt that
F~-------------------
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
104
the legislative bodies of towns should have some input 
into the arbitration process.
Question # 4: What is you opinion of the availability
of compulsory arbitration for settling impasse disputes?
— "There ought to be some method of settling 
disagreements through negotiations with the help of 
mediation or conciliation."
— "There seems to be more of an effort to settle these 
things than before."
— "The imbalance of the arbitration process is a good 
thing because strikes are eliminated. Advisory 
arbitration didn't work. The main advantage of 
compulsory arbitration is that, "it's a hammer up 
against a brick wall and be ready for it"."
— "Some groups use it time and time again. In a couple 
places in large cities or where there is a history of 
trouble with the town they will arbitrate because the 
town can't turn it down."
— "Good question. It will depend on each individual 
unit. If the leadership of a union or board of 
education is more comfortable with arbitration than 
sitting down it will be used more often. I think it is 
dictated by the players in the community rather than the 
arbitration process itself."
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— "Very available. Negotiations are on a timetable and 
tied to board's fiscal year."
Arbitrators viewed availability in two respects.
One is that with its use one has to look at the parties 
involved and the past history of collective bargaining 
to see if arbitration's availability is viewed of as 
something which eliminates the problem of having a 
contract rejected. Others saw it as available because 
it is part of a process with strict timelines, which at 
times encourage parties to make an effort to settle 
their differences.
Question # 5; How have the bargaining parties responded 
to compulsory arbitration as a means of settling impasse 
disputes?
— "The parties have willingly accepted the results of 
the arbitration award."
— "There is less fooling around and posturing."
— "It really becomes a factor in the bargaining process.
I think that there is a reason for both sides to like 
the process and that reason is that it offers them a 
means of reaching an end. It gives us a comfortable 
feeling of dealing with one another. Probably why we in 
the process all get along pretty well."
F  -
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— "Initially, great hostility on the part of school 
boards. It is getting sophisticated and generally 
accepted with the positive improvement."
— "Unions, with general enthusiasm. Boards, with 
challenges, reluctance, belief that settlements are more 
costly."
— "Generally speaking teachers responded favorably 
through CEA. In philosophy, the Federation did not 
favor it. Proponderence of teachers supported binding 
arbitration and did everything they could. Boards of 
education are basically at issue with the presumption 
that arbitrators would intrude on the legal perogatives 
of the school board, (DeCourcy)."
— "It has accelerated the responses of school boards.
Before they could say g o  yourself. Now, the other
side of the coin. School districts accuse teachers of 
not bargaining and going to arbitration (because they 
know they will be getting the increase offered by the 
board or better)."
— "Teachers are certainly favorable. The first year 
they got the increases they wouldn't have gotten 
otherwise and they deserved them."
Although initial acceptance of the act was stronger 
for teachers, with time, boards of education have also 
found greater acceptance in the legislation. It has
F -
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made it easier for sides to settle a dispute when they 
are unable to do so on their own and gives them a means 
of reaching an end in the negotiations process.
Question # 6: Given your experience, how would you
evaluate the use of compulsory arbitration vs. mediation 
for settling impasse disputes?
— "As time goes on solving more at mediation. In 1979 
it was a new thing and everyone thought our side is 100% 
right, everyone else 100% wrong. It didn't work out 
that way. In a number of cases, lo and behold, the last 
best offer of both sides was the same. By far, the 
mediation stage is where most impasses are solved. It 
creates more intelligent bargaining and the two sides 
get closer together."
— "Initially, mediation was very much weakened by 
arbitration because unions saw binding arbitration as a 
way to get what they wanted. Mediation has come back to 
a more permanent role."
— "Don't see it as a versus. It is sequential. I 
believe strongly in mediation."
— "I get the impression more impasses are successfully 
mediated than go to arbitration. My reaction, mediation 
is preferred to arbitration because it is voluntary.
With arbitration there is some bitterness afterwards
¥  -
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because it is put down throats."
— "No versus. They are not conflicting. Mediation is 
the step before arbitration. Mediation is good to the 
extent that it acts as a "catalyst" to help with 
bargaining."
— "I think you'll find most contracts are settled in 
mediation. It's very effective because mediators use 
arbitration to settle with the parties. It is stronger 
now than prior to arbitration. Before nothing would 
happen."
— "I don't think mediation works nearly as well as 
compulsory arbitration. Mediation is very weak because 
it has no leverage, no way to make or force people to do 
something. The only skill it brings to the process is 
creativity and imagination."
Many of the arbitrators' responses dealt with the 
strengthening of mediation as a procedure in the impasse 
process. These responses included mentioning the fact 
that mediation is a "strong arm" approach and that 
negotiations go on around the clock. Some also 
mentioned that mediators use the fact that if no 
agreement is met between the parties on their own, 
arbitrators will intervene and make the decision for 
them. This differs from mediation's prior role under 
advisory arbitration when the arbitral decision was not
F  ~
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mandated.
Some individuals mentioned that it was preferable 
for parties to come to agreement in mediation because 
results are from the bargaining parties and that 
although arbitration may still be necessary, many issues 
in dispute can be solved in mediation before going onto 
compulsory arbitration.
Question # 7: What unanticipated effects of the
legislation have manifest themselves since initiation of 
the compulsory arbitration procedure?
— "Use of stipulated awards that forestall, that's the 
biggie."
— "I think substantial increases in teacher salaries is 
in part tied into arbitration factors. There are also 
some outside factors. During early 80's the inflation 
rate. After inflation went down, teachers were still 
getting salary rates that were high. Also, there have 
been no strikes. We were hoping for it and it was 
realized. Finally, there has been greater acceptance by 
boards of education of the process."
— "I can't think of any. The impact of Enhancement 
Legislation was unanticipated at the time of the 
arbitration statute. Early to say how it interplays 
with the process."
F — ..
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— "It has not resulted in decreasing disparities in 
salaries between richer and poorer areas."
— "Depends on who you are. One thing that I think is 
beginning, is an unexpected leveling process because 
arbitrators are basically the same people statewide.
What is beginning, throughout the state, is a statewide 
salary schedule."
— "The national trend for teacher improvement and salary 
increases have made money a non issue during the last 
12-16 months."
— "Parties sometimes use binding nature of award (not 
subject to challenge by local fiscal authorities) to 
disguise a dispute between fiscal authorities on one 
hand and the board and union on the other, as a dispute 
between board and union when they are really in 
agreement."
— "None to my knowledge. They were all rather candid. 
Boards of education, it did exactly what they said would 
happen, increases in salaries."
— "The parties have an accordion effect. When it first 
started it was not unusual to have 80-90 issues (ie. 
lunch time). That has come down. The biggest number this 
year was 37 or 38. Boards are now throwing in more 
issues to use as bargaining chips because three out of 
four times teachers get the salary."
— "Timelines have been modified over the life of the
F
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act. Geared toward mandated fiscal date for approval of 
budgets."
The effects on salary were mentioned by many of 
the arbitrators as being unanticipated, be it the fact 
that increases were higher than expected, the fact that 
a leveling began to occur throughout the state or that 
salaries were still thought to be unequal in rich as 
opposed to poor areas. The Education Enhancement Act 
and the distribution of large sums of money for teacher 
salaries was not anticipated at the onset of the act, 
but will no doubt effect it during the next few years, 
and perhaps even more so after funding for the act ends 
(depending on what type of legislation will be 
introduced to take its place).
Arbitrators also did not anticipate the use of the 
stipulated award when disagreement was primarily between 
the town fiscal authority and the bargaining parties.
They noted that although the process was to prevent 
strikes, the fact that none has occurred has been a 
surprise because even with the law it was thought that 
some groups would still strike.
Question # 8 : What is your overall assessment of the
practice of compulsory arbitration as you have 
experienced it? Should it be (a) continued, (b)
F   '
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The following comments give the arbitrators' 
overall assessment of the compulsory arbitration 
procedure in Connecticut.
— "Continued. If eliminated, it is back to producing 
teacher strikes. There should be some method of impasse 
resolution and it should foster the procedure to have 
parties reach settlement."
— "Continued. I don't know what modifications can be 
made for my limited experience. There is undue burden 
on the neutral arbitrator."
— "Modifications. Time for writing decisions. CABE got 
it into the legislation two years ago. The other way 
was more convenient."
— "Continued, and despite recommendations I gave earlier 
I would rather leave it alone. If you have a good case 
you will prevail. There is no question that binding 
arbitration with timelines means that by February about 
every contract is settled. Others are only unsettled 
because they have a later budget submission date."
— "I think that what it has done is a typical response 
to a problem. We are throwing money at the problem.
The bottom line of the compulsory arbitration structure 
is to increase the cost of education tremendously. More
F r  "
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important, if one tenth the amount of energy was spent 
on looking at education itself. What are we buying with 
$50,000 salaries and what is worthwhile to children in 
the long educational process?"
— "I thing the law should be continued and modified to 
eliminate feigned disputes."
— "Continued because there is no choice. The 
alternative is teacher strikes and that is not viable. 
Modify the statutory criteria for rendering awards and 
decrease the effect that comparable data have on 
rendering an arbitration award. The statute is well 
drafted and has shown that it is working well."
— "It's apparent that it's working. I have a vested 
interest because I am paid. Continued. I don't think 
that anyone would disagree that it hasn't eliminated 
strikes and achieved its purpose. Modified to give 
arbitrators the ability to do something in between.
With extremes neither result is good - too high or low." 
— "Continued. I think it works very nicely. One of the 
few pieces of legislation that works and was 
intelligently drafted."
— "I'd continue it. I'm not sure how modified. I'd 
like to restrict some subjects that go into arbitration. 
Don't like the interim bargaining."
— "Modified by the concept if it is done fairly and 
justly. The concept is good. Strikes are bad. But in
F   '
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— "Eliminated or modified along the line of the Canadian 
plan (option under this plan is to strike or use binding 
arbitration to settle impasses). Some people are 
cautious by nature and want the security blanket of 
binding arbitration and there are those who hit the 
bricks if there is an impasse."
— "What do you want the labor/management ambiance to be. 
I'd be inclined to have some strikes. Locally, 
communities should be able to decide what to do and 
teachers should be able to go on strike if they want to. 
I'd eliminate it if it were up to me, but in Connecticut 
I am a "voice crying in the wilderness". It is not a 
majority point of view."
— "Continued. I'm an advocate of the whole system 
having worked under the old system. Both sides can be 
frustrated at times because you don't always get what 
you want, but it leads to bargaining. It's been 
effective and met its goals and objectives."
— "It hasn't made any dramatic changes. It has 
stabilized the process. Timetables could be more 
realistic. Hours, evaluation procedures and school 
calendar should be mandatory."
— "Continued. I don't think it should be modified much. 
Works fine the way it is. They try to abolish it every 
session. Now there is a pending bill that would deal
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with reopening negotiations during a contract. Every 
once in a while it would be nice to diffuse a problem in 
the middle without going through the entire contract. 
People will be lured into taking advantage of the above. 
This thing is so rigid it makes other things work.
Teacher strikes are not a good thing and its the wrong 
kind of business to shut down.”
Arbitrators for the mostpart, advocate continuation 
of the compulsory arbitration law with some 
modifications. The addition of more time for writing 
awards was a concern of arbitrators, expecially since a 
narrative giving reasons for each decision must be 
given. Some individuals would also like to have some 
additional items subject to arbitration. Although a few 
arbitrators would like to see the process eliminated, 
they do not see that as a possibility, and instead 
offered modifications that would make the law more 
desirable from their point of view.
American Federation of Teachers 
response to interview questions
In speaking with a representative of the American 
Federation of Teachers (AFT) who has been involved in 
the compulsory arbitration process as an AFT staff
c :
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member and as a local teacher bargaining unit president, 
the major occurrence which led to legislation for 
compulsory arbitration in Connecticut was teacher 
strikes, with "the major strike that pushed the 
legislation over the barrel" taking place in Bridgeport.
The organization does not see any strengths in the 
act but sees in as "a crutch". The basic weakness being 
that sometimes both sides reject a contract because they 
"know that they cannot get it through the town fathers" 
and instead opt for a stipulated award. In the area of 
effectiveness it was noted that, "you don't have 
prolonged negotiations going on forever and forever."
Initially, the availability of compulsory 
arbitration was viewed as being "the greatest thing 
since sliced bread", but it has been "used as a crutch 
to have others make the decision for you." Contracts 
are beginning to have a common denominator, and are 
looking the same.
Mediation has become a tool to force settlement and 
mediators are now more influential in getting 
settlements than they were prior to legislation for 
compulsory arbitration.
When looking at the unanticipated effects of the 
legislation, "basically a oneness of contract has 
manifest itself into teacher contracts in Connecticut" 
with contracts sporting the same language, money and
F
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issues.
Finally, the Federation would like to see the act 
modified with a limited right to strike, a procedure 
"which in Connecticut circles is the Canadian Plan, 
because compulsory arbitration is not going to be 
eliminated".
Connecticut Association of Boards of Education (CABE) 
response to interview questions
The Connecticut Association of Boards of Education 
(CABE) representative, who had served as counsel to the 
association, noted that the occurrence of several 
strikes in major cities (Bridgeport and New Haven) led 
to the move for compulsory arbitration legislation in 
Connecticut.
In viewing the process its strength was seen as 
being that it, "certainly does provide finality to the 
process". That arbitrators "tend to award the going 
rate" with settlements at the beginning of the year 
becoming the going rate "despite past history and the 
financial condition of the community being considered", 
was felt to be a major weakness of the legislation.
CABE finds the legislation effective in resolving 
disputes but feels that it is a "high price to pay" and 
would opt for modifications with finality. One
r  ...... .
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possibility in this area would be to limit the issues 
going to arbitration.
In examining how parties have responded to the 
procedure, it was noted that in some districts as part 
of the strategy, teacher organizations will wait it out 
because they do well in arbitration.
In responding to the use of mediation, it was noted 
that the success of mediation is something that depends 
on the skill of the mediator.
CABE did not see any unanticipated effects of the 
legislation, but instead felt that the organization had 
anticipated what would happen which they felt resulted 
not necessarily in a balance in decisions.
Finally, a first recommendation would be to 
eliminate the legislation, but politically speaking it 
was not viewed as being a possibility because 
Connecticut is a labor intensive state. Instead, 
modifications such as the one calling for a written 
narrative (a modification CABE wanted and got into the 
law) were suggested. Also, CABE plans to continue a 
lawsuit which was previously dismissed on a 
technicality, challenging the constitutionality of the 
law.
Connecticut Department of Education 
response to interview questions
r ~
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The Department of Education consultant for 
teacher/board negotiations noted that the primary 
occurrence that was responsible for the move to enact 
compulsory arbitration in Connecticut was the Bridgeport 
teachers' strike. The Connecticut Education Association 
(CEA) had been looking for binding arbitration for a 
long time and they (CEA) sponsored the bill which then 
came to the Education Committee.
Since the law's enactment it has done "what it was 
supposed to do, stop strikes."
At the time of the interview the General Assembly 
was voting to add hours as a mandatory subject of 
bargaining to the bill along with midterm bargaining. 
(Both items passed.)
A strength of the procedure from the administrative 
perspective of the Commissioner is that "it has resulted 
in labor stability in the State of Connecticut since 
1979." There have been several procedural changes in 
the law and in 1985 the state Supreme Court found the 
statute constitutional.
When viewing how parties have responded to the act 
it is seen as being "an act that is fairly 
administered." There is no waving on the statute (i.e. 
timetable) and parties appreciate the act because "the 
rules of the game don't change because you are in a big
IF
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city versus a small town.”
In viewing the mediation and arbitration procedures 
the department notes that there are fewer arbitrations 
with more solving of impasse taking place in mediation. 
This is in part due to the track record of arbitrators 
and conscientious mediators who have enhanced the 
success of mediation. Finally, it was noted that the 
law has done what it is supposed to do, and eliminated 
the potential riff that can occur in a community.
Connecticut Education Association (CEA) 
responses to interview questions
The Connecticut Education Association (CEA) 
perspective on the compulsory arbitration process was 
presented by its bargaining coordinator who lists the 
1978 Bridgeport strike as being the "biggest single 
occurrence" which led to the move for compulsory 
arbitration legislation in Connecticut.
The CEA views the legislation as being "overall, 
the best collective bargaining law in the country." The 
one item mentioned that was missing from the legislation 
was the absence of "hours" as a mandatory subject of 
bargaining (hours did become a mandatory subject of 
bargaining in June, 1987).
The availability of compulsory arbitration is
c :
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viewed as being a "tremendous stimulus at the bargaining 
table" and mediation which was effective 10% of the time 
prior to compulsory arbitration is now effective 50% of 
the time.
An unanticipated result of the act was how high 
settlements have been. "We never anticipated the 
percentage settlements that we have been getting since 
passage of the law. Although the negative side is that 
we thought we would do better on working conditions."
Finally/ it was noted that, "the act has been the 
best thing that's ever happened for teacher/board 
negotiations in Connecticut and it's been refined enough 
that's it's working very well."
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Chapter 6 
Conclusions and Recommendations
Examination of statistical data covering the first 
six years of the compulsory arbitration process in 
Connecticut brought to light some interesting facts 
about the process, its usage and arbitral decisions.
Teacher contracts in Connecticut are settled by one 
of three means: (1) In negotiations without the use of
an impasse procedure, (2) in mediation or (3) in 
arbitration. The following results are from the 
analyses of data on usage of the procedures noted above.
Statistical analysis of the data on how teacher 
contracts were settled for the 1979-80 through 1984-85 
period demonstrated that for the combined six year 
period statistical significance occurred with the use of 
compulsory arbitration as a means of resolving impasses 
between bargaining parties. Further testing was 
conducted on a yearly basis to determine when these 
differences might have taken place. Results showed that 
between the years 1979-80 to 1980-81 and 1982-83 to 
1983-84, statistically significant differences were 
found. One possible reason for this happening during
122
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the 1979-80 to 1980-81 period is that it was the first 
year during which compulsory arbitration was available 
under the act and there may have been a tendency for 
parties to try out the new procedure during its initial 
stage to see how it worked. The second time that 
statistical significance occurred, was between 1982-83 
and 1983-84. This happened after two years during which 
no statistical differences occurred. In this instance, 
it is difficult to make any determination on possible 
reasons for the difference. One possibility is that 
during that time period, a higher number of full 
contracts might have been up for negotiations as opposed 
to reopeners from prior contracts dealing with only a 
few issues. Secondly, the procedure may have been 
effected by a cyclical process, with a recurrence of 
arbitrations in towns that had used arbitration in 
earlier years. No dramatic changes occurred in the 
arbitration legislation, nor were there any notable 
changes in statewide economic conditions that might have 
created the differences from 1982-83 to 1983-84.
The same six year period was examined for any 
significant changes in the number of contracts that were 
negotiated without the use of any impasse procedure. 
Initially, data was examined for the total six year 
period. No statistically significant difference was 
evidenced during that time. Further tests were
F ......
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completed on the data on a year to year basis. On a 
year to year basis, a significant difference was noted 
between the years 1981-82 to 1982-83.
A possible factor contributing to this occurrence 
could be that after an initial rush to use the 
arbitration process, many parties realized that you 
could not only win but lose a decision, bringing about 
more of an effort to reach an agreement without the use 
of the arbitration process.
A final comparison of frequency of contract 
settlement procedures tested for any significant 
difference between the use of mediation and arbitration 
as the final step in a contract agreement.
No significant difference was found when comparing 
the two over the total six year period. Additionally, 
tests were conducted making comparisons on a yearly 
basis. The tests for individual years found that a 
significant difference was found during the 1979-80 to 
1980-81 period, the first year of the statute's 
availability. This area can be compared to results in 
an earlier question which found significance during the 
same time period when arbitration was compared to the 
other combined means (without impasse and mediation) of 
coming to a contract agreement. Perhaps, as with 
anything new, after an initial period of use, parties 
began to attempt to do more bargaining on their own.
F ----------
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If one is looking at the use of the arbitration 
procedure to see if a "narcotic effect" has occurred 
with its usage, you would have to say that none seems 
evident. The use of arbitration as a means of reaching 
a contract settlement did not remain statistically 
significant when compared with other means of settlement 
time and time again. It would be more prudent to 
suggest that there were other reasons for statistical 
differences to occur on and off again during the 
procedure's first six years in existence.
After comparing the different types of procedures 
utilized in reaching contract agreement for public 
school teachers, analyses were conducted on the number 
and types of issues taken to arbitration.
First, data on the mean number of issues taken to 
arbitration was examined to determine if a statistically 
significant difference existed with the mean number of 
issues taken to arbitration over the six year period. A 
difference was found to occur between 1981-82 to 1982- 
83.
Once again, a possible reason for significant 
differences in the mean number of issues arbitrated 
could be related to the number of full contracts as 
opposed to reopeners that were being negotiated for the 
period from 1981-82 to 1982-83.
An examination of the frequency with which
F
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districts engaged in the compulsory arbitration process, 
shows no apparent trend in the year to year use of 
compulsory arbitration. Initially, the number of 
districts using the process was large. It then leveled 
off after the first year with a slight increase during 
1982-83.
Another area of statistical questioning addressed 
whether certain areas of issues were taken to 
arbitration more often than others. The initial test 
for statistical significance demonstrated that a 
difference did occur. Follow up testing was done to 
determine between what areas the differences occurred.
In testing between the 23 issues, a significant 
difference occurred between how often the issue of 
salary was arbitrated when compared to 18 other issue 
areas.
Significant differences also occurred when 
comparing the frequency of arbitrating issue of 
workday/year issues to all areas except salary, salary 
scale, medical insurance, leaves and miscellaneous 
issues. While frequency of arbitrating the issue of 
medical insurance was statistically significant when 
compared to all issue areas except salary, salary scale, 
workday/year, leaves and miscellaneous.
A difference also occurred when comparing how 
frequently the area of leaves of absence was arbitrated
F -
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
127
When compared to 13 other areas. While differences were 
statistically significant between miscellaneous issues 
and 10 other areas being arbitrated. There were no 
other statistically significant differences evidenced 
when comparing other issues to one another.
In looking at the differences that occurred 
between miscellaneous issues, it would be difficult to 
even attempt to decipher Why those differences might 
have occurred. The miscellaneous category included all 
issues that did not fit into one of the 22 other 
categories, and served as a catchall for those issues 
that could not be placed elsewhere.
In collective bargaining contracts, the major item 
being negotiated is usually salary regardless of whether 
those negotiating are teachers, policemen or 
professional football players. Therefore, it is not 
unusual to have significance occur between salary and a 
number of other issue areas. The same may apply in part 
to the areas of medical insurance and leaves, both of 
Which could deal with substantial monetary inputs.
In examining the area of workday/year it should be 
noted that teacher hours were not a mandatory issue for 
bargaining prior to June, 1987. A number of times the 
issue was found to be nonarbitrable under the DeCourcy 
decision Cl62 Conn. 566, 295 A.2d 526 (1972)], but was 
still admitted as an issue for arbitration because
W -----
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nonarbitrability does not prevent an issue from being 
placed into arbitration. For instance, if the teacher 
association submitted a last best offer stating that 
the workday would begin at 8:00 A.M. and end at 3:00 P.M. 
and the board's last best offer was that the issue could 
not be arbitrated, under the DeCourcy decision, the 
arbitrator(s) would choose the last best offer of the 
board.
The next area of testing examined where any 
statistically significant differences existed between 
the number of times that arbitrator decisions were in 
favor of the board or the association.
Test results demonstrated that no statistically 
significant differences existed in the arbitrators 
deciding issues for the board or the association for the 
six years combined. Additionally, no difference was 
evident for the individual years.
The final analysis examined whether the category of 
the issue arbitrated was independent of the arbitration 
award being in favor of the board of the association.
A statistically significant difference was found to 
occur in only two of the 23 categories. Those two areas 
were salary and workday/year. In the area of salary 
arbitrators were more inclined to make decisions in 
favor of the associations, while they were more inclined 
to make workday/year decisions in favor of the board.
No other significant differences were found when
F : ""
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comparing arbitration decision to the area of issue 
being arbitrated.
Although an initial response might be to look at 
the issue of salary and conclude that arbitrators decide 
salary issues in favor of the association, there are 
some other factors that must be considered. One is that 
in recent years there has been a move not only in 
Connecticut but nationwide to raise teacher salaries to 
those comparable with other professions. A second, is 
that the differences between the last best offers of 
both groups may have been very close, or in some cases 
the same, indicating both sides' realization of the need 
for salary increases for teachers, something that was 
recognized statewide with the Legislature's move to 
raise minimum teacher salaries in 1986.
Likewise, when examining the tendency for 
arbitration awards in the area of workday/year to be 
made in favor of boards of education, it should be noted 
that in relation to items such as teacher hours which 
were non arbitrable, the tendency for arbitration panels 
to choose the board's position may in part be due to the 
fact that the board saw an issue as being non arbitrable 
and the panel, in following the guidelines of the lctw 
decided in the board's favor.
A review of the interviews which were conducted as 
a segment of this study, demonstrated that the
F ' ~ '
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individuals involved in the compulsory arbitration 
process in Connecticut are very knowledgable of the 
procedure and enjoy their work.
Arbitrators representing each of the three interest 
groups recognized and candidly spoke of the 
legislation's strengths, weaknesses, effectiveness, and 
suggestions for change. They realized the importance of 
collective bargaining between parties and the value of 
mediation in acting as a catalyst to aid parties in 
coming to a contract settlement. Many stressed the 
importance of parties coming to an agreement on their 
own and that arbitration was to be used only when 
parties could not come to agreement.
The arbitrators commented on the professionalism of 
all of the individuals involved in the process and their 
willingness to work together. The calibre of 
individuals along with the strength of the arbitration 
legislation together appear to be making the process a 
very successful means of resolving impasse disputes in 
Connecticut.
One amazing result of the compulsory arbitration 
legislation in Connecticut is that no strikes have 
occurred since the law's enactment. Although strikes 
have been illegal, that fact had not prevented them from 
occurring prior to enactment of the arbitration act.
It is also commendable to note that very few
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arbitration awards have been challenged in the courts. 
Moves to vacate the awards, by filing a motion in 
superior court within thirty days following receipt of 
the award [Conn. Gen. Stat. ss 10-153 f(c) (7) (1983)] 
have been infrequent. Celentano and Williamson (1985), 
note that there were only thirteen motions to vacate 
awards (this number also included administrator awards 
from a total of 208 arbitrations) in Connecticut during 
the first five years of the act. The fact that a motion 
to vacate was seldom initiated suggests that in making 
arbitration decisions arbitrators are adhering to the 
dictates of the law and are not acting in a way which 
would prejudice the substantive rights of the parties.
In looking to the future it would be interesting to 
take a continued look at data over the next few years 
because of the 1986 Enhancement Act [1986 Conn. Acts 1, 
ss (1) (Spec. Sess.)] which raised minimum teacher 
salaries to over $20,000. It will be even more 
intriguing to examine the data for possible trends after 
allocations for the Enhancement Act are depleted in 
1989. Changes may result, if that time the state 
continues to subsidize teacher salaries or give that 
responsibility back to the towns. If that is the case, 
it will be interesting to observe how local communities 
that are less affluent will meet the monetary demands of 
raises that are already set into the teacher salary
F  : '.............
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structure because of the Enhancement Act. Will they 
raise taxes or want teachers to take pay cuts (an 
unlikely but possible result)? Presently, the 
legislature has voiced that it will aid districts 
financially after Enhancement Act funding runs out with 
a possible 50-50 funding (a situation in which half of 
the funding would come from the state and other half 
would come from the municipality) resulting.
In looking at what the sitaution will be a few 
years from now, the Department of Education is in the 
process of redesigning the formula for the Guaranteed 
Tax Base that provides allocations to school districts. 
This change is being designed to incorporate money that 
was provided under the Enhancement Act into the 
Guaranteed Tax Base structure.
After completing this segment of research on 
Connecticut's experience with compulsory arbitration, 
there are additional areas that should be examined for 
possible research development for the future. One such 
area is to examine the administrator groups that are 
covered by the arbitration legislation to see what 
differences have occurred with their use of the 
procedure since they, unlike teachers, are not covered 
under the Enhancement Act which provided for minimum 
teacher salaries in recent years. The area of salary 
and changes that may take place in the arbitration of
F r
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this issue and its effect on teacher salaries prior to, 
during and after funding through the Enhancement Act 
would give greater insight into the area of compulsory 
arbitration and its effect on teacher salaries. 
Additionally, in the area of salary research, a study on 
the impact of the legislation on town finance boards 
would demonstrate how arbitration legislation has affected 
the financial situation of individual municipalities.
Another area of interest would involve an 
examination of different socio/demographic areas of the 
state to determine if any differences occur regarding 
the use of the arbitration procedure and the types of 
issues arbitrated in those locales. Also, an examination 
of issues that became arbitrable near the conclusion of 
this study and their effect on the process in the future 
could provide information on the priority with which 
parties view different issues being arbitrated.
Finally, a comparative case study of states that 
have compulsory v. voluntary arbitration would offer 
insight into which type of procedure has proven to be more 
beneficial in the resolution of impasse disputes.
In concluding, the compulsory arbitration procedure 
appears to be doing quite well as a means of solving 
impasse disputes in Connecticut. It has managed to 
bring finality to the bargaining process when parties 
are unable to reach a conclusion on their own, and yet 
parties do not rely on arbitration as their only means
F ■' " "" ‘
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of reaching contract agreement. Boards of education and 
teacher organizations still solve the majority of their 
contract negotiations before reaching the arbitration 
stage.
In looking to the future of collective bargaining, 
states that are developing or amending collective 
bargaining legislation, along with those that may 
presently be using voluntary arbitration or the right to 
strike to settle impasse disputes may want to review the 
situation in Connecticut to see if a similar procedure 
would benefit the educational process in their state.
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Appendix A 
Notes from Legislative Hearings
The following cites segments from sessions in the 
Connecticut state house and senate prior to voting on 
the bill for compulsory arbitration:
During the state senate hearings on Tuesday, May 
8, 1979, various amendments were proposed and voted on 
concerning Senate Bill 2, An Act Concerning Last Best 
Offer Binding Arbitration for Teacher Contract Disputes.
At the inception of the hearing a move was made to, 
"remove the bill from debate and action", by Senator 
Post, because of "possible conflicts" (Senator Knows). 
Senator Mustone then moved for acceptance of the Joint 
Committee's Favorable Report and passage of the bill.
Along with this action, background on the current 
law was summarized, concerning the fact that presently, 
when a disputed contract between the board of education 
and the employees exclusive bargaining unit went to 
arbitration, the recommendation would be non binding 
while contract settlements that did not go to arbitration 
would remain subject to veto by the local or regional 
legislative body. Senate Bill 2 would require that 
once a disputed contract was submitted for arbitration 
it could no longer be rejected by referendum by 
the legislative body of the district.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
136
It was also noted that, as under current law, when 
no contract agreement was evident, parties would go to 
mediation. If settlement is not reached four days after 
mediation, or on the ninetieth day prior to the budget 
submission date the matter goes to arbitration.
Following this discussion, the following amendments to 
the bill were introduced:
Senate Amendment Schedule A, offered by Senator 
Buzzuto stated that, "any action of the regional board 
in terms of its conduct of negotiation, pursuant to 
Section 10 - 153 shall be performed within the full 
purview of the public." The amendment was then opposed 
by Senator Shelly. A roll call vote (when 20% of the 
membership call for it with a voice vote) was taken on 
the amendment. The results were yea-7, nay-25, with 4 
absent from voting. The amendment failed.
Senate Amendment Schedule B, offered by Senator 
Skowronski, was directed toward line 144 and section (c)
2 of the bill. This amendment would make, "mandatory 
that the fiscal authority or the agent of the budgetary 
authority appear as part of the board of education 
presentation." (Note: In Connecticut, the town or
regional legislative body (finance board) and not the 
board of education has the authority to raise taxes to 
meet school budgets.)
There was a total of 32 voting for Amendment B,
F  ; '■■■
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with 4 members absent. The motion for the amendment 
failed by a vote of yea-12; nay-20.
Senate Amendment Schedule C, which was also offered 
by Senator Skowronski, "deletes from the act the use or 
employment of a single arbitrator and would provide that 
the decision be made by the three member panel." This 
amendment which would eliminate the option of using a 
single arbitrator instead of a tripartite board was 
defeated by a yea-9; nay-23 vote.
Senate Amendment Schedule Df which was offered by 
Senator Schneller would, "restrict last best offer 
binding arbitration to those issues that relate to 
salaries and fringe benefits." This amendment failed on 
a close vote of yea-15; nay-17. Therefore, issues being 
arbitrated could not be restricted to areas that 
involved only salary and fringe benefits.
There were no further amendments to the bill. A 
general discussion followed during which various members 
of the senate spoke.
During that discussion Senator Denardis rose in 
support of the bill and Senator Matthews rose to oppose 
the bill.
The discussion that followed pointed out, that 
unlike the municipal employees' act that was found 
unconstitutional on three points (standards, the appeal 
process and accountability), these points "had been
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addressed in this bill" (Senator Mustone).
Senator Owens then spoke on the number of teacher 
strikes that had taken place in the state. He noted 
strikes in Milford, New Britain, New Haven and "fourteen 
days of shame" in Bridgeport when 265 teachers were 
detained in facilities (Niantic and Camp Hartell), many 
for the entire two week period.
Following the discussion, a final vote on Senate 
Bill 2 resulted in its passing in the senate by a yea- 
24; nay-8 vote.
The house discussion on Senate Bill 2 An Act 
Concerning Last Best Offer Binding Arbitration for 
Teacher Contract Disputes began with opening comments by 
Representative Henderson, in which he moved for 
acceptance of the Joint Committee's Favorable Report of 
Senate Bill 2, and passage of the bill in concurrence 
with the senate. In his comments, he stated that this 
bill would amend the present Section 10 - 153 of the 
statutes and provide a, "finality to the negotiations 
process." He mentioned the Bridgeport strike which 
"resulted in over three quarters of a million dollars in 
court fines" and gave statistics on the municipal 
binding arbitration law which over a three year period 
(1975-1978) resulted in 741 negotiated contracts, 8% of 
which were referred to arbitration.
Later, some amendments to the bill were proposed
F--------- --
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and voted upon. They included:
House Amendment Schedule A, presented by 
Representative Glassman, "would limit those items for 
compulsory binding arbitration to those items which 
included salary, fringe benefits and grievance."
A lengthy discussion was given on this amendment 
and the fact that there had been 55 teacher strikes in 
Connecticut during the prior 14 year period. The total 
number voting on Amendment A was 143, with 72 necessary 
for passage. The amendment, which was very similar to 
Amendment D in the senate failed by a close vote of yea- 
69; nay-74, resulting in no restrictions that would 
limit the type of issue that could be arbitrated.
A second amendment, House Amendment Schedule B, 
offered by Representative Allen was for the, "mandatory 
appearance of the fiscal authority." This amendment was 
similar to one proposed in the senate that would mandate 
the appearance of arepresentative of the budgetary 
authority. There was an insufficient number of the 
membership (less than 20%) requesting a roll call vote, 
so a voice vote was taken. The nays were in the 
majority and the amendment failed.
House Amendment Schedule C, to Senate Bill 2 was 
adopted and ruled technical.
House Amendment Schedule D, offered by 
Representative Berman, would "give the option of the
F~ r-----------------------  '
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right to strike to teachers along with binding 
arbitration." A roll call vote resulted in a yea vote 
of 35 and a nay vote of 107. The amendment failed and 
therefore, did not provide the option to strike.
House Amendment Schedule E, offered by 
Representative Meyer, would make the arbitration award 
subject to a thirty day veto by making changes in line 
205, to strike "referendum", line 200, to strike "not 
withstanding the provisions of" and the striking of 
lines 201 to 204 inclusive. The yea vote was 62 and the 
nay vote was 78, resulting in failure of the amendment's 
proposal to make awards subject to veto.
House Amendment Schedule P, offered by 
Representative Matties, provided for last best package 
offer arbitration by making changes in line 193, to 
strike "each individual issue" and to insert in lieu 
thereof "all issues". In line 196 to strike "separately 
each individual" and insert in lieu thereof "the" and to 
strike "each" and "individual". There were 22 yea votes 
and 118 nay votes and the amendment failed passage, with 
the procedure for binding arbitration remaining as an 
issue by issue rather than total package procedure.
Prior to a final vote on the bill, Representative 
Robertson requested a vote change from the positive to 
the negative and Representative Onorato requested a vote 
change from the negative to the positive.
¥
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Voting on Senate Bill 2 as amended by House 
Amendment C was taken with 70 votes necessary for 
passage. The vote was yea-70? nay-69. Twelve members 
were absent and did not vote. The bill passed by one 
vote and was signed into law.
In effect, the passage of the act resulted in a 
piece of legislation that provided compulsory 
arbitration for the resolution of impasse disputes on an 
issue by issue basis with the strike remaining an 
illegal act under the law. Additionally, issues for 
arbitration were not to be limited and in the 
arbitration procedure parties could choose a single 
arbitrator or a tripartite board to hear and decide the 
arbitration cases.
F  ----   "  '
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Dental ins. 0 1
Life ins. 2 0
Ex tracurricular 0 1
Athletic 2 0
Severance pay 0 0
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Salary 1 1
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Leaves 1 3
Reduction/recall 1 0
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Salary 1 1
Medical ins. 1 0
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